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Editor’s Note
This Spring 2018 edition of the James Blair Historical Review
marks a milestone in our publication’s history—never before has our
journal released two issues in one academic school year. The sheer level
of work to produce just one issue has typically required two semesters of
investment. However, with a great deal of effort on behalf of our editing
team and peer reviewers, we managed to push our boundaries and
produce not one, but two compilations of exemplary undergraduate
historical research for the Fall 2017-Spring 2018 academic year. Given
that additional issues grant students more opportunities to share their
stellar work with the rest of the world, we hope that publishing biannually will become an ongoing practice for our journal.
But besides starting this new convention, we also revived an
earlier tradition—publishing an issue in print. The last time our journal
existed in a physical form was 2014. I believe that history is best
consumed from old-fashioned ink on paper, so I am happy to announce
that physical copies of the Spring 2018 issue of the James Blair
Historical Review will be available in early Fall 2018 for students and
faculty of the College of William & Mary, as well as visitors.
Of course, none of these achievements would have been possible
without tremendous support from many people. I would like to thank my
fellow editors for suggesting article revisions to authors and formatting
this issue, and our peer reviewers for highlighting the articles most fitting
for publication. I would also like to thank our faculty advisor, Dr. Stump,
for overseeing our journal’s progress this past year. Lastly, I would like
to extend my greatest appreciation for every author who submitted
articles to our journal. Our publication would not exist without their
assistance, and we wish we could publish all of the amazing papers that
we receive. Alas, only four could make the cut for this issue, but I am
incredibly pleased with the results—and I hope you, the reader, will
share the same sentiment. Thank you for engaging with our Spring 2018
issue, and please enjoy the subsequent 70+ pages of excellent historical
research.
Sincerely,
Barrett Mills
Editor-in-Chief
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Stirring Appeals: Elite Southern Women,
Confederate Fasts, and Christian Unity
Daniel Burns

Introduction
Amidst the turmoil of the American Civil War, Confederate
President Jefferson Davis established national days of fasting to
instill within the South what he considered ethical, religious ideals.
During those fasts, Davis intended for Southerners to pray to the
Christian God and abstain from eating and drinking to reinforce a
Confederate sense of religious purpose and identity. But what of
those social groups, such as elite Southern women, that had no say
in the creation of these fasting days? 1 How did those fasts affect
them and their desires for Christian unity throughout the South?
Regardless of where they lived and their denominations, elite
Southern women’s religiosity combined with their support for Davis
to inspire their attendance of fast-day religious sermons throughout
the conflict.2
In the war’s first year, fast-day sermons’ espousals of
Confederate righteousness calmed elite women’s early-war
anxieties and rendered them disinclined to emphasize collective
fast-day adherence. However, after years of hardships and military
defeats, women could no longer merely accept that God favored the
South—though their religiosity sustained their attendance at fasting
services. The sermons that ministers delivered during national fasts
in the second half of the war explained Confederate failures as God’s
punishment for Southerners’ sins, and thus helped convince elite
women that collective Southern adherence to fasting days would
help appease their god. After 1862, Southern women stopped
writing of how fasting services alleviated their fears; instead, they
“Stirring Appeals”
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desired collective Southern compliance with national fasts to ensure
future Confederate success.3
The argument that elite women appealed for collective
Southern fasting in the war’s second half adds two dimensions to
contemporary Civil War historiography. First, current scholarship
on transformations in Southern women’s wartime relationships with
Confederate officials often overlooks elite women. Stephanie
McCurry’s Confederate Reckoning argues that Southern “women
citizens’ relationship with the state dates from the Civil War….
With the war, the necessity and frequency of citizens’
communications with state governors increased exponentially and a
growing portion came from women.”4 McCurry limits her argument
mainly to non-elite women. Yet by 1863, elite women occasionally
reprimanded soldiers and officers who did not meet their standards
of fast-day adherence. As the war progressed, they unintentionally
mimicked their non-elite counterparts by increasingly defying
antebellum notions of proper gender relations. By the war’s second
half, both the non-elite women about whom McCurry writes and the
elite women in this essay considered it necessary to address male
officials with their wartime concerns.
Second, historians who have covered religion in the
American Civil War have neglected to discuss how women reacted
to Confederate fasts. Scholarship on Confederate fasting days
focuses mainly on how CSA officials and Southern ministers
interpreted the importance of those national events. An example of
this sort of examination includes historian James Farmer’s The
Metaphysical Confederacy, which discusses certain characteristics
common to many early-war fasting sermons. 5 Yet an analysis of
how elite women regarded Confederate fasts reveals how wider
portions of the Southern population—those whose gender restrained
them from establishing national fasting days or preaching during
them—understood the relationship between government and
religion. Such an analysis clarifies how the South’s wealthiest group
of disenfranchised civilians connected their prewar religious
convictions to their support for the Confederacy through their nearunanimous defense of the national fasts that their government
established. Perhaps most importantly, an examination of Southern
8
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women’s interpretations of Confederate fasts takes another step
towards explaining how the entire Southern populace engaged with
and understood the purpose of national fasting days. It provides a
perspective on the topic that complements other historians’ research
on how Southern sources of secular and religious authority
interpreted Confederate fasts.
Factors Influencing Fasting
Two factors primarily influenced elite Southern women’s
support for fasting days throughout the war. First, antebellum
religious developments predisposed elite women to engage in
national fasts. Although men filled ministerial positions throughout
the South, women also played roles in prewar religious functions
and societies. As historian Jon Butler explains, antebellum white
women “frequently found opportunities to exercise spiritual
leadership in the interstices of male-dominated Protestant
denominations” and “worked in their own [religious] institutions
outside the denominations.”6 As an example, elite Southern women
participated in the American Sunday School Union since its
inception in 1817. Females in the organization created Christian
Sunday schools for children in the country’s rural areas. 7
Participation in such a society granted elite women decades of
experience in spreading Christianity throughout the South by the
war’s start.
Southern women’s prewar religiosity convinced at least
some of them that antebellum presidents had the authority to declare
national fasts. Mary Jeffreys Bethell, a slaveholder from North
Carolina, wrote on January 1, 1861 that “South Carolina has seceded,
the states are making every preparation for War[.] Next Friday is the
day set apart for prayer and fasting by the President Buchanan, that
God would save us from Civil War and blood guiltiness.”8 Historian
Harry Stout observes that this “national fast day for peace and
reconciliation proclaimed by President Buchanan for January 4,
1861, failed miserably” for Southern clergy and laypeople alike.9
However, Bethell did not question Buchanan’s right to establish that
“Stirring Appeals”
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fast—she instead accepted his authority to do so and even
appreciated the fast’s objective of preventing civil war.
The second factor predisposing elite Southern women’s
appeal for fasting days was the group’s reverence for Jefferson
Davis. Such admiration exceeded their former support for
antebellum presidents and often lasted throughout the war. If, like
Bethell, elite women appreciated national fasting days, their respect
for Davis made them all the more likely to comply with Confederate
fasts. As historian Drew Faust explains, those women believed that
“institutions of power were extensions of divine government. God
had delegated his power to white men…. In the view of many
southern women, this created a continuum of power with God the
highest master, a patriarch one level of command above Jefferson
Davis.”10 In many elite Southern women’s minds, Davis led a nation
that defended their livelihoods from Union aggression and thus
deserved their respect. Even after the Confederacy’s surrender,
Gertrude Thomas, a plantation mistress from Georgia, wrote in May
of 1865 that her “womanly sympathys [sic] go out for Jeff Davis and
I do hope and pray that he will escape. Not to save my right arm
would I betray him if I knew where he was and yet I was beginning
to think him despotic.”11 One month after the Confederacy’s defeat,
Southern women like Thomas still refused to abandon Davis or their
“womanly sympathys” for him.12
Ultimately, both elite Southern women’s religiosity and
support for Davis compelled them to attend fast-day church services.
This obligation proved strong enough that when they could not meet
it, some women voiced frustrations. During a national fast in May
of 1862, Kate Carney, a daughter of a wealthy merchant who lived
in Union-occupied Murfreesboro, Tennessee, wrote that it “was the
Fast day appointed by Jeff Davis, and we kept it until dinner, though
we had no service in our churches. It seems hard that we are not
permitted to pray to God, when and how we want to.”13 In Carney’s
opinion, the fault of the fast that Davis declared lay not in
governmental overreach, but in that the Union occupation
undermined her city’s ability to provide church services for her to
attend. Carney felt exasperated with her inability to connect with
God to the extent that she desired. She considered the fast a religious
10
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privilege that should have provided her with church services and the
sermons that ministers delivered therein. Carney’s testimony
bolsters the notion that elite Southern women eagerly attended fastday church services, which paved the way for their eventual belief
in the utility of fasting for Confederate military success.
The Saliency of Sermons: Views on Fasting in the War’s First
Year
However, simply attending these fast-day church services
was not sufficient for the aforementioned development. Rather, elite
Southern women’s evolving takeaways from the sermons at these
services shaped the course of their views on wartime fasting.
In the war’s first year, Southern ministers used national fasts
to proclaim that God blessed the Confederacy. Henry Tucker, a
Baptist minister from Georgia, delivered a sermon to his state’s
legislature on November 15, 1861, a date that “HIS EXCELLENCY
THE PRESIDENT OF THE CONFEDERATE STATES”
designated a fasting day.14 Though he spoke directly to the Georgia
state legislature, Tucker’s sermon typified how Confederate
ministers from various denominations vindicated the Confederacy
in the first year of the conflict. 15 He recognized his audience in
exclaiming, “My countrymen! It is right for us to resort to all the
means of defence [sic] which Providence has placed within our
reach. It is proper to call into action our best civil and military talent,
to strain every energy to the utmost in supplying the material of war.
As for that sublime faith which we have in the unconquerable valor
of our troops, I admire it, I partake in it.”16 Tucker supported the
Confederacy as a nation for which God provided. Though he did not
claim the South invincible, his defense of the “unconquerable valor”
of Confederate troops likely appealed to those Southerners who felt
unsure about the Confederacy’s chances of victory. 17
Presbyterian minister Thomas Verner Moore’s fast-day
sermon to a congregation in Richmond, Virginia on November 15,
1861 stressed similarly God’s favorable interpretation of the South.
In his sermon, Moore claimed “that there has never been an army
since the time of Cromwell, in which there was a more pervading
“Stirring Appeals”
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sense of the power of God than our own…. The resources of the
mighty organization [the United States], whose stupendous gage of
battle we fearlessly took up, were so vast in men, money, munitions
of war, forts, fleets and armies, that unless God had been with us we
must have been crushed.”18 Moore considered Confederate military
victories against the North’s superior numbers and supplies proof of
God’s blessing of the South. The later publication of Tucker’s and
Moore’s sermons, in addition to other sermons that replicated their
espousals of Confederate righteousness, enabled their messages to
reach a broader audience that included elite Southern women.
Fast-day sermons that echoed the pro-Confederacy
sentiments of Tucker and Moore helped convince some elite women
that God blessed the South in the war’s first year. Those women
allowed Southern clergymen’s promises of God’s favor to augment
their Confederate patriotism. In June of 1861, Judith McGuire, an
Episcopal Confederate nurse who lived in Richmond and considered
herself a “Lady of Virginia,” wrote: “Yesterday was set apart by the
President as a day of prayer and fasting, and I trust that throughout
the Confederacy the blessing of God was invoked upon the army
and country. We went to church at Millwood and heard Bishop
Meade. His sermon was full of wisdom and love…. He is full of
enthusiasm and zeal for our cause.” 19 McGuire’s attendance of
Meade’s sermon reinforced, if not created, her belief that God
favored the South. She stated that Meade “says that if our ancestors
had good reason for taking up arms in 1775, surely we had much
better, for the oppression they suffered from the mother-country was
not a tithe of the provocation we have received from the Government
at Washington.”20 Meade’s sermon buttressed McGuire’s belief in
the South’s right to secede and mitigated the uncertainties she may
have harbored regarding the Confederacy’s formation.
In defending the Confederacy and proposing God’s favor of
the South, fast-day sermons assuaged the early-war anxieties that
some Southern women possessed. Elite women who attended fastday services described how Southern ministers’ enthusiasm for the
CSA directed them away from fear and towards allegiance to the
Confederacy. Margaret Crawford Adams, the wife of a former
American Minister to Spain, lived in South Carolina at the start of
12
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the war. She recorded the story of a female friend who, shortly after
South Carolina seceded, “called to see me…. The only topic of
conversation then was the prospect of war. My friend said: ‘I do not
approve of this thing. What do I care for patriotism? My husband is
my country. What is country to me if he be killed…. I will have
poverty and my children will starve.’” 21 Yet from this early-war
anxiety evolved a sense of righteousness of and due sacrifice for the
Southern cause. That fasting day relieved Adams’s friend, who,
“coming out of church, on a day appointed for fasting and prayer,
where we had listened to one of the great Dr. Thornwell’s stirring
appeals…said to me [Adams]: ‘I feel that I could do deeds of
heroism.’”22 Thornwell’s oration does not exist in print, but it likely
echoed other early-war sermons’ assertions that God blessed the
Confederacy. Adams recorded her recollections in 1903 and may
have mistaken some of her story’s details. Despite this, her reference
to how Thornwell’s message relieved her friend’s apprehensions
reveals her long-held belief that fasting-day services calmed elite
women’s early-war fears.
Elite women who attended fasting services in the war’s first
year rarely discussed their desires for collective Southern adherence
to national fasts. When they did, they seldom mentioned the tangible
threats against which Southerners could defend themselves by
unifying as a Christian populace. Instead, they made general
statements that revealed only their personal preferences for religious
unity. On a fasting day in April of 1862, Kate Cumming, an
Episcopal Confederate nurse from Alabama, recorded that “I hope
it [the public fast] will be duly observed. I believe that it is well kept
in the army. There has been no show of keeping it in this hospital;
the excuse is given – ‘too much to do.’”23 Cumming did not note
that she believed Southern unity during the fast would cause future
military success or relieve civilians’ hardships. Her frustrations
reveal only her personal desire for Christian solidarity.
Like Cumming, Judith McGuire discovered in Confederate
fasts chances to gather with other Southerners in support of the
South and its Christian identity. On November 15, 1861, McGuire
recorded that it “was fast-day – a national fast proclaimed by our
President. I trust that every church in the Confederacy was well
“Stirring Appeals”
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filled with heart-worshippers…. This whole household was there [at
church] – indeed, the whole neighborhood turned out.”24 McGuire
might have engaged in wishful thinking when positing that the entire
South partook in church services. Her residence in the Confederate
capital, where much of the population likely attended fast-day
services, may have influenced her belief that the rest of South did
the same. At no point did she claim, though, that Southern religious
unity would benefit the Confederacy. These writings of Cumming,
McGuire, and others imply that elite Southern women had not yet
constructed their belief in the military benefits of fasting during the
war’s first year.
The Tide Turns: Views on Fasting in the War’s Second Half
However, by 1863, elite Southern women had suffered
through enough wartime hardships to challenge their early-war
opinions about God’s blessing of the South. Confederate military
defeats at the Battles of Shiloh and Antietam, among others,
undermined their previous faith in Providence. Personal suffering
combined with those military losses to create religious difficulties
for Southern women, a group that felt sure of God’s favor in the
war’s first year. Historian Drew Faust explains that by 1863, the
“ever mounting death toll worked its terrible effects on women’s
sensibilities. By the middle years of the war almost no family
remained exempt.” 25 Faust contends that for “all God’s
promises…it was hard to dispel doubt as months of war stretched
into years and as the pain of individual bereavements mounted
almost beyond endurance….” 26 In Southern women’s opinions,
ministers’ early-war promise that God blessed the South had not
materialized.
Despite years of wartime hardships, Southern women’s
religiosity inspired them to continue engaging in fasting days.
Following the South’s deadliest defeat at the Battle of Gettysburg,
elite women continued to note their adherence to national fasts. In
August of 1863, Ellen Virginia Saunders, an Alabama woman with
family members who served as officers in the Confederate military,
noted a “proclamation by President Davis making this a day of
14
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humiliation, fasting, and prayer. Ah, how many prayers are wafted
to the throne of Light this day for fathers, husbands, brothers, sons,
and lovers! May God on high hear us!” 27 Confederate military
defeats did not undermine Saunders’s desire to engage in the
national fast. Her religious convictions sustained her desire to join
others and pray for her country and loved ones.
Even at the end of the war, a sense of Christian obligation
compelled some elite women to comply with fasts. Eliza Frances
Andrews, a Methodist who experienced the war’s end from a
Georgia plantation, wrote that March 10, 1865 was a “day of public
fasting and prayer for our poor country…. After dinner the
gentlemen proposed a row on the lake, but Mrs. Maxwell and I were
the only ones that had fasted and we wouldn’t indulge in a frolic,
and the others said they were afraid they might be drowned for their
sins….”28 Though Andrews realized the dire state of her nation, her
religiosity compelled her and Mrs. Maxwell to fast for their country.
Elite Southern women whose Christian convictions
prompted them to attend fast-day services in the conflict’s second
half heard messages that differed from early-war sermons. Southern
ministers altered their early-war fasting sermons to offer religious
explanations for previous Confederate military failures and
Southern hardships. From 1863 to the war’s end, Southern ministers
used fasting days to argue that God had punished the Confederacy
for its people’s sins. Historian Drew Faust explains that in the
opinions of Southern clergymen, “setbacks had to be seen as
warnings that called upon southerners to cleanse themselves of
wickedness and impiety, to transform themselves and their world to
find God’s favor.” 29 Episcopal minister Stephen Elliott explained
the cause of Confederate hardships when he delivered a fast-day
sermon to a Georgia congregation in August of 1863, one month
after Confederate defeat at Gettysburg and Vicksburg. He stated:
In turning ourselves, therefore to God in fasting and prayer, let
us truly humble ourselves and beseech Him to show us our own
hearts and to convict us especially of those sins which are
offensive to him and which have placed us in the wrong way[.]
There should be great searchings [sic] of heart to-day [sic]. From
“Stirring Appeals”
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the President of the Confederate States, who now occupies, for
a time, the most responsible position in the world, to the
humblest person who is involved in their destiny, each one of us
should examine himself and find out, if possible, wherein he has
offended God and turned away his face from us.30

Elliott posited that every Confederate person had an obligation to
discern what they did to incur God’s wrath on the South. All
Southerners needed to improve their religious adherence to elicit
God’s favor as the war continued; failing to do so would harm the
entire Confederacy, not just those who refused to comply.
Post-1862 fast-day sermons convinced some elite women
that God’s blessing of the South required collective adherence to
Confederate fasts. Elite women’s compliance with fasting days no
longer calmed their wartime fears. Rather, those women wished to
ensure that other Southerners participated with them. Judith
McGuire discussed her experiences during a Confederate fast in
March of 1863: “To-day [sic] was set apart by the President as a day
of fasting and prayer. Some of us went to Richmond and joined in
the services at St. Paul's.”31 McGuire’s residence in Richmond put
her near Davis, whom she wrote was “in church…. One of the ladies
of the hospital, seeing this morning two rough-looking convalescent
soldiers sitting by the stove, exhorted them to observe the day by
prayer and fasting.” 32 Though McGuire did not mention what
ministers argued in their fast-day sermons, they likely mimicked
Elliott’s emphasis on Southern religious unity.
That message inspired one of the nurses to undermine
antebellum gender roles, which stressed feminine deference to men,
and to rebuke soldiers who did not adhere to the fast. According to
McGuire, one of those soldiers “seemed to have no objection to the
praying, but could not see the ‘good of fasting,’ and doubted very
much whether ‘Marse Jeff fasted all day himself—do you reckon he
does?’ The lady laughingly told him that she would inquire and let
them know, but she reckoned that such was his habit.”33 The nurse’s
desire to persuade the soldiers to observe the fast inspired her to
confront Davis’s wife and ask her about her husband’s fast-day
habits. McGuire contends that Mrs. Davis claimed “‘that Mr. Davis
never eats on fast-day, and…as soon as he returns from church he
16
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shuts himself up in his study, and is never interrupted during the day,
except on public business.’ Of course, this was soon given as an
example, not only to the two convalescents, but to the whole
hospital.”34
Unlike in the war’s first year, by 1863 McGuire no longer
exclaimed that she trusted in God’s blessing. Nor did she imply that
her adherence to the fast calmed her wartime fears. Instead, she
recorded how she and other nurses took it upon themselves to ensure
Confederate fast-day compliance. McGuire’s residence in the
Confederacy’s capital and her proximity to the president may have
influenced her favorable interpretation of Davis’s fast-day routine.
Yet her reference to other nurses’ efforts to promote the fast reveals
how a wider base of elite women emphasized Southern religious
unity by 1863.
The belief that God’s blessing of the Confederacy required
communal adherence to fasts drove some women to admonish
Confederate officers for their irreligiosity. Kate Cumming wrote
about a Confederate fast in August of 1863, one month after
Southern defeat at the battles of Gettysburg and Vicksburg. She
stated that “Our chapel is finished. Mr. Green preached in it, and an
excellent sermon he gave us; it was quite stirring and
encouraging….” 35 Though Mr. Green’s sermon does not exist in
print, he gave it in the same month that Stephen Elliott delivered
Ezra’s Dilemna, and thus likely stressed Confederate religious
unity.36 That message resonated with Cumming, who on the same
day recounted:
The morning services were pretty well attended by the privates;
some of the officers instead of going played checkers. I had a
conversation with one of them on the subject, and told him that
the war would not close until men gave God the homage which
he demanded. He did not agree with me; I asked him if he
believed the Bible. He answered yes. I then asked him if he and
the others had obeyed the commands in it, in seemingly grudging
to give God that one day. I said nothing more, but was gratified
to see him attend the afternoon service.37
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Cumming did not assert that her attendance of Green’s sermon
resolved her concerns regarding the war. Instead, that sermon
seemed to convince her of Confederate religious unity’s importance.
Unlike in the war’s first year, when she felt frustrated about a lack
of adherence to a fast but did nothing to combat it, Cumming
admonished a Confederate officer who did not meet her standard of
religious commitment. Her desire for Confederate victory drove her
to disregard propriety and ensure attendance at fast-day services.
After 1862, elite Southern women expressed vexation when
they could not match other Southerners’ commitment to fasts.
During a Confederate fasting day in August of 1864, Susan Bradford
Eppes, a Methodist who lived on a Florida plantation, noted: “This
is a day of fasting, humiliation and prayer. Our armies in Virginia
and in the West have suffered reverses of late…. All who can, go to
church; all the churches hold services…. Some stay all day, for they
are fasting, but Father will not let us fast absolutely…. Father in
Heaven, take care of our poor boys!”38 Eppes’s Florida residence
and reference to recent Confederate military defeats reveals how
those losses affected elite women throughout the South. That her
mention of fast-day unity follows her note regarding military
failures implies that she considered collective Southern adherence
necessary to forestalling future losses. Eppes did not admonish other
Confederates for their irreligiosity; after all, she witnessed uniform
attendance of fast-day services. Instead, her statement that her father
would not let her fast throughout the day reveals that she wished to
emulate other Southerners’ religious commitment. Eppes did not
state that fast-day services calmed her anxieties about the war or
convinced her of God’s blessing. Rather, she likely believed that
collective fasting could implore God to support the Confederacy’s
future.
All of the above demonstrated that by 1863, elite women
rarely mentioned that fasting days calmed their fears, and rather
stressed collective fast-day adherence. However, Mary Jeffreys
Bethell presents one potential exception to this argument. Bethell’s
husband represented North Carolina in fighting for the Confederacy.
She discussed her opinions of God after watching her husband leave
home for the fight in November of 1864: “My husband started to the
18
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army yesterday for Godsboro, he will get back to Court on a
furlough…. I continue to look to God, I do trust in him, but I am
tempted and tryed [sic].”39 Bethell’s husband’s departure into a war
that she knew caused suffering made her question the deity that
allowed that to happen. Yet in that same entry Bethell went on to
write that “I went to Union today to prayer meeting, it was public
fast day. We had a profitable time at Church, good deal of feeling.
Read the Bible and exhorted, we sung several hymns. I have
received comfort this evening my trouble is gone, my soul is happy,
hallelujah. I will praise the Lord forever, he has answered me.”40
Bethell did not consider Southern religious unity during the fast
necessary for relieving her anxieties. Despite this, her attendance of
a fast-day prayer meeting, and not a sermon, reveals that she likely
did not hear Southern ministers’ appeals for religious unity. Had she
attended a sermon, she may have joined her contemporaries in
stressing collective Southern engagement with national fasts.
Conclusion
Given their religious commitment in the antebellum era, it
should not surprise anyone that elite Southern women adhered to
Confederate fasts throughout the Civil War. Nor does it appear
strange that post-1862 fasting sermons inspired them to wish for
collective Southern compliance with those fasts. But given the
nuance of Southern fasting days in the conflict’s historical period, it
initially seems peculiar that elite Confederate women supported
them so strenuously. As historian Harry Stout explains, “The
ascendance of the public fast in the Confederacy…is truly
remarkable. Through all of American history up to 1860, public fasts
had been quintessentially Northern and ‘Puritan.’ Yet, when
secession came to war, the Confederacy would employ the public
fast more frequently than the North.”41 In this sense, the Civil War
might have served as a watershed moment in American religious
history—a period during which Southern Christian adherence
surpassed Northern religiosity.
But if this were the case for the entire Southern populace, it
would undermine the fact that elite Southern women rarely—if
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ever—challenged or found odd those days of fasting. Such a view
forgets that those women exited the antebellum era with religious
dispositions that inclined them to emphasize public fasts throughout
the war. With these thoughts in mind, the Civil War served as a
watershed moment in Southern American religious history only in
the sense that CSA officials acted in ways that reaffirmed their
civilians’ Christianity and allowed the Confederate government to
approach those civilians’ levels of religious conviction. One of the
principal ways in which that government drew closer to the
religiosity of its civilians—and especially that of its female
civilians—was through its enactment of national fasts.
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Overseers’ Quest for Control in the WPA Slave
Narratives
Delia Karamouzis

Introduction
William Scarborough, a notable historian of the American
South, claims that “no figure occupied a position of greater
importance in the managerial hierarchy of the southern plantation
system than did the overseer.”1 Scarborough challenges the myth
of the overseer as “an uncouth, uneducated, dissolute, inept slave
driver” and instead argues that these descriptions were largely a
construct of the members of the planter class. In “Plantation
Overseers and Their World: The Stereotype, Life and Image,”
Robert Wayne Webber substantiates Scarborough’s claim,
asserting that “When we think of overseers today, we visualize an
evil white man with a whip. As this image would lead us to
believe, overseers are pictured as violent, amoral, brutal, cruel
and uncaring…and this cruelty has overshadowed a true
understanding of overseers and they have become a caricature of
base ignorance and cruelty.”2 This paper will seek to refute the
claims of both Scarborough and Webber through an examination
of overseers as presented in the Works Progress Administration
Slave Narratives.3 It will argue that this “caricature” of overseers
as “violent, amoral, brutal, cruel and uncaring” is largely merited,
as overseers sought to assert physical, psychological, and sexual
control over slaves through the use of both ritual and
unpredictable violence.4
This essay examines the WPA Narratives collected by the
Federal Writer’s Project of former slaves.5 These sources contain
interviews from over two thousand former slaves in seventeen
states, describing their time in bondage. Scholars readily
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acknowledge that these interviews are flawed. While over two
thousand slaves were interviewed, these individuals were not
necessarily representative. Most interviewees were urban, male
house slaves, and samples of former slaves were
disproportionately high in some states compared to others. Rural
residents and enslaved field workers remain largely
underrepresented in the interviews, though both skilled and
unskilled workers enjoyed representation.6
The ages of the ex-slaves also raise questions about the
validity of their testimonies, as more than two-thirds of the
interviewees were over eighty years old at the time of their
interviews. Many scholars debate the effects of failing memory
on the descriptions of slavery provided in the interviews, as
historical recollections are often subjective in nature. Historians
also examine the extent to which the interviewees truly
experienced the harsh realities of slavery as children, or whether
their experiences of the peculiar institution were colored by their
youth. 7 Similarly, other scholars inquire whether the long
lifespans of the former slaves interviewed indicate that they were
treated better, or experienced fewer punishments than those of a
typical slave.
The problem of age and memory is particularly relevant
to the discussion of overseers. Former slaves’ perception of
overseers is largely correlated to the degree to which they were
directly exposed to them. Many former slaves interviewed were
children during the time of slavery, thus much of what they know
about overseers may have been influenced by the experiences and
comments of their parents who worked under overseers in the
fields. The brutality of overseers differed by plantation and by
region especially, with a tendency towards more severe violence
in the Deep South—specifically on rice plantations. Finally,
particular attention must be paid to the fact that a sizable number
of the slaves interviewed were house slaves, as this significantly
affected their interactions and perceptions of the overseer.
Despite the obvious flaws of these sources, one cannot
ignore the historical value in the “candor” these interviews
provide. 8 These narratives offer unprecedented access into the
stories of slavery from the mouths of those who experienced and
24
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witnessed the peculiar institution firsthand, and further serve as
indispensable resources in capturing the expansiveness of the
enslaved experience. In spite of the risks they faced, numerous
slaves felt compelled to share their experiences so future
generations would know the realities of slavery—even if some of
their messages were rather indirect. Interviewers often adopted
patronizing, condescending and paternalistic tones in their
interviews, due to the climate of race relations that existed during
the Great Depression.9 Escott notes that as a result of these racial
power dynamics between interviewers and interviewees, former
slaves often turned to more nuanced methods of communication
to convey substantive descriptions or realities of their
experience. 10 Despite the strong biases and attitudes of
paternalism and white supremacy that color many of the
interviews, the shrewd ability by which the former slaves
communicated provides readers with a windfall of valuable
information that allows us to better understand the nature of the
“peculiar institution” and, more specifically, comprehend the
roles of overseers and the dynamics that existed between the
enslaved and their overseers on the plantation.11
Plantation Overseers: Their Duties and Responsibilities
To provide some historical context on the subject at hand,
an overview of overseers’ obligations would prove beneficial.
Overseers had wide-ranging duties and responsibilities on the
plantation, typically specified in written contracts with masters.
In Down By the Riverside, Charles Joyner wrote that one master
included stipulations into his overseer’s contract, specifying that
his performance “would be judged first and foremost by the
general well being of the negroes, their cleanly appearance,
respectful manners, active and vigorous obedience, their
completion of tasks well and early, the small amount of
punishment; the excess of births over deaths; the small number of
people in the hospital, and the health of children.” Joyner noted,
however, that “overseers varied in their effectiveness in carrying
out the planters’ desires.” 12 Joyner also cautions that masters’
primary goals—absolutely clear even if unstated—were to make
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a profit, thus any admonitions that overseers take good care of the
enslaved were secondary concerns.
As recollected in the narratives, awakening the slaves
each day to begin work represented one of the main duties of
overseers. Reverend Silas Jackson recalled arising each morning
before sunrise to the sound of the overseer’s horn.13 Alec Pope
also described waking up each morning at four o’clock at the
command of his overseer.14 “Just like yesterday – I hear the old
overseer making round of the cabins every day at four, and I
means in the morning too, when the night sleep is the best, and
folkses tumbling out of the door getting ready for the fields,”
added Daniel William Lucas.15 After slaves arose each morning,
overseers urgently directed them to the fields, often with no time
to tend to their families or eat before their labor began. “All de
slaves dat was field hands, dey had to work mighty hard. De
overseer, he pretty rough sometimes. He tell em what time to get
up en sound de horn for dat time. Had to go to work fore daybreak
en if dey didn’ be dere on time en work like dey ought to, de
overseer sho whip dem,” described Charlie Grant.16 “The Negro
overseer would wake up the slaves and have them in the field
before they could see how to work each morning,” Robert
Grinstead testified, “and as they would go to work so soon their
breakfast was carried to the field to them.”17
One cannot understate the deliberate and prominent
inclusion of being awoken by the overseer each morning. The
narratives’ common mentioning of this seemingly trivial fact after
several decades, unprompted by the interviewer, deserves
attention as it conveys the psychological authority that overseers
maintained over slaves. Slaves started and concluded each day at
the command of the overseer, and evidently resented the
psychological governance of overseers over their period of rest—
one of the most vulnerable shared experiences of human beings.
Once the slaves began their labor, the overseer harbored
responsibility for seeing that the slaves worked efficiently.
George Womble observed, “An overseer was hired by the master
to see that the work was done properly.”18 The overseer was also
in charge of dismissing slaves once their work had been
completed and inspected, the latter of which consisted of
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checking their rows or counting the number of crops picked.
Slaves faced the constant threat of violence from overseers, and
Mary James described that this threat was realized if overseers
believed the slaves were working at an insufficient pace.19 “De
oberseer dat we had was right mean to us when we didn’ work
our rows as fas’ as de others, an’ sometime he whup us, wimmen
an’all,” added Clare C. Young.20
Another duty of the overseer was handling the passes that
enabled slaves to travel between plantations. Reverend Silas
Jackson explained, “When we could get work, or work on
someone else’s place, we got a pass from the overseer to go off
the plantation but had to be back by nine o’clock on Saturday
night or when cabin inspection was made [by the overseer].”21
Oftentimes, overseers also served as the principal means of
medical care for slaves. Bert Mayfield stated, “At that time there
were few doctors and when the slaves would get hurt or sick, they
were usually looked after by the master or by their overseer.”22
However, utilizing the services of doctors proved rare since
masters viewed doctors as inconvenient and expensive.
The overseer’s duties extended beyond the mere labor of
the slaves. Overseers usually supervised the personal and spiritual
lives of the slaves as well, largely as a means of demonstrating
ubiquitous psychological control. Anthony Dawson revealed,
“The overlooker made everybody clean up and wash de children
up [On Sundays].”23 The overseer even oversaw the worship of
the slaves; Reverend Silas Jackson recalled, “On Sunday the
slaves who wanted to worship would gather at one of the large
cabins with one of the overseers and have their church. After
which the overseer would talk. When communion was given the
overseer was paid for staying there with half the collection taken
up, some time he would get 25 cents.”24 Not only did overseers
attempt to control the labor of the enslaved, but they also tried to
exert psychological control over the precious personal time that
slaves had away from labor.
Lastly, overseers’ duties included other responsibilities
specified by masters, which varied from plantation to plantation.
Mary James noted, “In the quarters we had furniture made by the
overseer and the colored carpenters; they would make the tables,
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benches and beds for everybody.” 25 Alexander Scaife recalled,
“Overseers I recollects was, Mr. Sam Hughes, Mr. Tom Baldwin,
and Mr. Whitfield Davis. Mr. Baldwin was de best to me. He had
a still-house out in a field whar liquor was made. I tote it fer him.
We made good corn liquor.” 26 Overseers often also had
connections to patrollers, Reverend Silas Jackson observed, and
were always on the lookout for runaway slaves from other
plantations, in the hopes of reaping rewards for their capture.27
When asked about the duties of overseers, Andy Marion replied,
“All de overseer done was to wake us up, see to feeding stock,
and act biggity.”28 In short, overseers possessed a great number
of responsibilities from which they derived authority to subjugate
their slaves, a reality which will be further expanded upon
throughout the paper.
Plantation Overseers: Who Were They?
Besides understanding their duties—and to better
comprehend their motivations—one should recognize exactly
who overseers were. The narratives routinely describe overseers
as “poor men.” Perry Lewis affirmed that the majority of poor
white men in Maryland served as overseers.29 “Our overseer was
a poor man,” detailed Harriet Robinson, “He was paid to be head
of punishment.” 30 As William Wiethoff observed, both whites
and blacks served as overseers.31 White overseers were typically
poor males who sought to collect both income and experience in
running a plantation, with the aim of one day becoming a master.
White overseers served as the authority figure on the plantation
in the absence of the master, as clarified by Mrs. M.S. Fayman
who stated, “[The plantation] contained 8000 acres, of which
more than 6000 acres were under cultivation, and having about
350 colored slaves and 5 or 6 overseers all of who were white.
The overseers were the overlords of the manor; as Haynes [her
Master] dealt extensively in tobacco and trading in slaves, he was
away from the plantation nearly all the time.”32
Perceptions of white overseers varied from slave to slave.
A common freedmen’s epitaph for overseers was “poor white
trash.” Slaves favored this term as it offered them an opportunity
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to regain some of the control and agency that overseers so
insatiably demanded. The term “poor white trash,” however, was
not a socioeconomic evaluation of overseers but rather a moral,
social, and ethical evaluation. White overseers enjoyed special
economic privileges by virtue of their race and status as an
overseer, such as sharing a house with the master on the plantation.
Stephen McCray explained, “Master had a brick house for hisself
and the overseer. They was the only ones on the place.” 33 When
asked about her overseer, Emma Howard responded, “How did
we feel ‘bout a white man who would be over-looker? We called
him ‘po white trash, He wasn’t thought much of by anybody.”34
Similarly, Hal Huston attested, “All of us niggers called all the
whites ‘poor white trash.’ The overseer was nothing but poor
white trash and the meanest man that ever walked on earth.” 35 In
an interview with Ben Horry of South Carolina, the interviewer
wrote, “On Waccamaw – and same true of all south as all know –
white overseers worst kind of ‘white trash’ – respected less by
negroes than by whites.”36
Some slaves pointed to the racial divide that existed
between white overseers and their slaves as the source of hatred
and tension. Hannah McFarland observed, “The overseer was sho’
nothing but poor white trash, the kind who didn’t like niggers and
dey still don’t, old devils. Don’t let ‘em fool you, dey don’t lak a
nigger a’tall.”37 Bert Luster echoed McFarland’s sentiments and
reported, “We didn’t have no mean overseer. Master Astern and
his son jest told us niggers what to do and we did it, but 50 miles
away dem niggers had a mean overseer and dey called him ‘poor
white trash,’ ‘old whooser,’ and sometime ‘old red neck,’ and he
sho’ would beat ‘em turrible iffen dey didn’t do jest like he
wanted ‘em to.” 38 Stephen McCray reiterated the prevailing
attitude toward white overseers when he declared, “He wasn’t
nothing but white trash. Nothing else in the world but that.”39 One
ex-slave named Janie Gallman described playing with the
children of the white overseer as a child, often jumping rope with
them and spending the night in their house when the overseer left
the plantation. But despite her intimate relations with the family
of the overseer, even Gallman referred to the family’s patriarch
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as “poor white trash,” demonstrating the prevalence of this
ubiquitous sentiment towards white overseers.40
White overseers were occasionally relatives of the master,
usually sons or nephews. Through the employment of relatives,
masters could retain close ties to their overseers and ensure
transparency and supervision. Ophelia Whitley recalled, “His
[master] son Billy wuz de overseer an’ he wuz good ter git along
wid, but he shore made dem darkies wuck.” 41 However, some
slaves regarded white overseers as inferior to their black
counterparts, as illustrated by Andy Marion who specified,
“Master had an overseer twice. They was poor white trash, not as
good as de niggers.” 42 Thus, the narratives reveal that slaves
commonly regarded white overseers unfavorably, and slaves’
frequent reference to “poor white trash” adequately captured their
disdain for the white men who would take these violent jobs.
Besides lower class white men, black male slaves also
served as overseers on the plantation. Blacks served in lieu of
white overseers on some plantations at the desire of the master,
and they existed alongside and subservient to their white
counterparts. “Dey had Niggers over de hoers an’ white mens
over de plow han’s,” remarked Anna Baker. 43 Fred Brown
remembered having both a white and black overseer: “Massa
have overseer and overlooker. De overseer am in charge of wo’k
and de overlooker am in charge of de cullud women.”44 Robert
Grinstead similarly recalled, “There was one Negro man slave
who decided to not work after Master went to the War and the
white overseer was fired and the Negro overseer was acting as an
overseer.”45 White overseers viewed black overseers as a threat
to their position and their wages, William Wiethoff argues. 46
Unlike whites, black overseers still lived in their slave quarters on
the “street” where slaves resided. Black overseers “could hardly
aspire to be planters” but their status as an overseer afforded them
certain privileges, such as better living conditions. 47 Some
masters exhibited preferences in the race of their overseers, as
supported by Adele Frost who noted, “My master was kind to his
slaves an’ his overseer was all Negroes.” 48 Lizzie Farmer also
testified, “My grandpappy was Master Booker’s overseer. He
wouldn’t have a white man over his niggers.”49 However, other
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masters merely used black overseers in the absence of available
whites. Robert Grinstead recalled that when the Civil War broke
out his master left the plantation in charge of the white overseer
and his two sisters. Yet, Grinstead added that “as the overseers
were hard for them to get along with they were oftener without an
overseer as with one, and therefore they used one of the Negroes
as overseer for most of the time.” 50 Designations proved very
important to the discussion of white and black overseers.
According to Anthony Dawson, “We called a white man boss the
‘overseer,’ but a nigger was an over-looker.” 51 Emma Howard
confirmed this distinction and stated, “Jake was de over-looker.
He was a great, big cullud man.”52 Some slaves who conducted
the duties of overseers were not afforded the title of overseer.
Annie Young Henson testified: “We never had any overseers on
the plantation, we had an old colored man by the name of Peter
Taylor. His orders were law, if you wanted to please Mistress and
Master, obey old Peter.”53
Similar to white overseers, black overseers passed the
position of the overseer down among families. “My father was the
colored overseer,” recalled Richard Macks, “He had charge of the
entire population and continued until he was too old to work, then
mother’s brother took it over, his name was Caleb.”54 Lou Smith
also explained, “Old Master was his own overseer, but my daddy
was the overlooker. He was purty hard on them [the slaves] too,
as they had to work just like they never got tired.” 55 Anthony
Dawson testified, “One of them [overseers] was my pappy’s
brother. His name was John, and he was my master’s overlooker.
John could read and write and figger, and old Master didn’t have
no white overseer.”56
Slaves harbored different perceptions of the violence of
white overseers and black overseers. Some found white overseers
more violent, while others found black overseers tougher in
inflicting punishments. William Curtis declared, “Old Master was
good to all of his slaves but his overseers had order to make ‘em
work…Colored overseers was worse to whip than white ones, but
Master allus said, ‘Hadn’t you all rather have a nigger overseer
than a white one? I don’t want no white man over my niggers.’”57
In contrast, Ben Horry argued that in his experience, white
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overseers inflicted more brutal punishments as a method of selfpreservation for their own livelihood, while black overseers
showed more mercy. Horry compared his experience with both
black and white overseers when he stated, “Negro over seer – just
fresh out of Africa TURNED LOOSE. White obersheer a little
different for one reason! White obersheer want to hold his job…
Nigger obersheer don’t care too much. He know he going to stay
on plantation anyhow.”58 However, the interviewer noted at the
end of Horry’s interview his statement that the “cruel negro
overseer was shot down after Freedom – blood still on the ground
because he led Yankees to where silver, etc., was buried.”59 It is
true that “white overseers, according to the Slave Narratives,
tended to be harsher and stricter than black overseers,” but as
demonstrated above this varied from plantation to plantation. 60
The Violence of Plantation Overseers
In spite of these racial differences, the principle
characteristic underlying both black and white overseers was their
routine use of ritual and predictable violence. This practice
asserted both physical and psychological control over the
enslaved. “Massa would only whup a slave fer two things,”
recounted Emma Howard, “One thing was if things warn’t done
up jes’ right at hog killin’ time, and de other was iffen a nigger
warn’t clean when ‘ported for work on Monday mornin’s. Ol’
Massa didn’t do de whuppin’ hisse’f. Jake [overseer] did it, but
Massa sat dar on his horse to see dat only a certain number of
licks was given.” 61 Daniel William Lucas recalled the
psychological burden of violence he faced at the hands of his
overseer during his work in the field: “The old sun’s a-grinning
down like he was saying: ‘work, niggers, work!’ And the overseer
is saying the same thing, only we pays more attention to him
‘cause of the whip he shakes around when the going gets kinder
slow down the row.”62 Richard Macks similarly reflected on his
labor on a large tobacco plantation in Southern Maryland: “Men,
women and children had to work hard to produce the required
crops. The slaves did the work and they were driven at full speed
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sometimes by the owners and others by both owner and
overseers.”63
According to what the former slaves told their WPA
interviewers, working too slowly represented one of the most
common reasons overseers inflicted violence. Mary James
denounced the capriciousness of the work pace—the white men’s
“fancy”—when she reported: “The overseer lived on the farm. He
would whip men and women and children if he thought they were
not working fast… The slaves were whipped for not working fast
or anything that suited the fancy of the master or the overseer.”64
Reverend Silas Jackson remembered, “The slaves were driven at
top speed and whipped at the snap of a finger, by the overseers,
we had four overseers on the farm all hired white men. I have seen
men beaten until they dropped in their tracks or knocked over by
clubs, women stripped won to their waist and cowhided.” 65
Jackson, like James, highlighted that whipping was not
scientifically administered for a set pace by using the phrase “at
the snap of a finger.” Robert Grinstead recalled an ingenious and
sadistic method one overseer used to get a young slave to work
faster:
“One morning the breakfast was taken to the field and the slaves
were hoeing cotton and among them a lad about 15 years of age
who could not hoe as fast as the older slaves and the breakfast
was sat at the end of the rows and as they would hoe out to the
end they would eat, and if you would be late hoeing to the end
the first to go to the end would began eating and eat everything.
So, this 15 year old lad in order to get out to eat before
everything was gone did no hoe his row good and the overseer,
who was white at this time, whipped him so severely that he
could not eat nor work that day.”66

Overseers further abused slaves for taking breaks. “Old
Marster got kilt in de last year of de war, and Miss Margaret dat
was our Mistress, run de place wid overseers dat would thrash you
for all sorts of things,” recalled Mack Taylor.67 “If they ketch you
leanin’ on your hoe handle, they’d beat you; step out of your task
a minute or speak to a girl, they’d beat you. Oh, it was hell when
de overseers was around and de mistress nor none of de young
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marsters was dere to protect you.” 68 Similarly, Sarah Ross
recounted how “The slaves arose with the sun to begin their tasks
in the fields and worked until dusk. They were beaten by the
overseer if they dared to rest themselves.” 69 Hal Huston
confirmed others’ testimony: “The overseer’s name was Charlie
Clark. One day he whipped a man until he was bloody as a pig
‘cause he went to the mill and stayed too long.”70
Overseers inflicted particularly brutal punishments for slaves
who tried running away. Hector Godbold described, “Never
couldn’ go from one plantation to de other widout dey had a ticket
wid em. I see Sam Watson catch many of dem dat had run way en
buff en gag em.”71 Overseers usually sent bloodhounds into the
woods and surrounding plantations to catch runaway slaves.
Louisa Gause observed, “Some of de time, when de colored
people wouldn’ do what dey had been put to do, dey would hide
in de woods en stay dere till de overseer come after dem. Oh, dey
would find dem wid de nigger dog. When de overseer would find
out dey had run away, he would send de nigger dog to hunt
dem.”72 Mrs. M.S. Fayman also recalled, “One of the overseers
had a pack of 6 or 8 trained bloodhounds which were used to trace
escaping slaves.”73
The bloodhounds, like the overseers they operated under,
served as not only a physical threat to the slaves, but also a
psychological one. George G. King offered an example of ritual
physical punishment that was an effort to assert psychological
control: “The overseer would come every morning with the same
question: ‘Will you niggers promise not to run-away no
more?...One at a time the overseer would lead them from jail to
cut them with powerful blows from the lash, then drag them back
to be chained until the next day when more lickings were given
‘cause they wouldn’t promise.”74 Thus, overseers issued physical
punishments for slaves that attempted to run away, but also used
psychological threats, such as the use of bloodhounds, as a means
of retaining control.
Yet another means of overseer’s physical control was sexual
violence. Anna Baker recalled that her mother fled the plantation
when Anna was a child, and stated that she was too young to know
the reasons why her mother left. She noted that years later:
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“She tol’ me when she come after us, after de war was over, all
‘bout why she had to run away: It was on ‘count o’ de Nigger
overseers. Dey kep’ a-tryin’ to mess ‘roun’ wid her an’ she
wouldn’ have nothin’ to do wid ‘em. One time while she was in
de fiel’ de overseer asked her to go over to de woods wid him
an’ she said, ‘All right, I’ll go find a nice place an’ wait.’ She
jus’ kep’ a-goin. She swum de river an’ run away. She slipped
back onet or twict at night to see us, but dat was all.”75

Finally, overseers exacted violence on slaves for their failure
to complete an adequate amount of work under the “task system,”
which assigned a specific duty or quota for slaves each day. “On
the farm the slaves were assigned a task to do each day,”
explained Mrs. M.S. Fayman, “and in the event it was not finished
they were severely whipped.” 76 James Calhart James
acknowledged, “We had white overseers on the plantation, they
worked hard producing rice on a very large scale, late and early.
I know they were severely punished, especially for not producing
the amount or work assigned them or for things that the overseers
thought they should be punished for.”77 Louisa Gause similarly
explained, “De overseer, he would give you a task to do en you
had to do it, too, if you never been want your neck broke. Yes,
mam, de overseer would stock you down en whip you wid a
buggy whip.” 78 George Womble recalled that slaves received
lashes for being “careless” in their work and were often forced to
take their clothes off in the field for a cruel beating. Womble
further confirmed that slaves producing cotton, who used the
“gang system” as opposed to the task system, also experienced
abuse for not producing enough; slaves were whipped when they
failed to “pick the required three-hundred pounds of cotton
daily.” 79 Alec Pope echoed Womble and in talking about his
overseers stated, “Dey brushed us if we lagged in de field or cut
up de cotton. Dey could allus find some fault wid us.”80
Many overseers expressed violent tendencies, but others
proved downright sadistic. As noted previously, unpredictable
and arbitrary violence enabled overseers to assert not just physical
but also psychological control over the slaves. In their infliction
of sadistic, violent punishment, overseers sought to deprive slaves
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of any agency, as slaves possessed no way of mentally preparing
for the malicious whims of their overseers. The degree of violence
depended on the capricious mood of the overseer, which was
often heightened by the presence of alcohol. Overseers commonly
treated the lashes they inflicted on slaves with salt, pepper, and
vinegar to prolong and aggravate the pain. Mrs. John Barclay
attested, “[The overseer] would whip us ‘till we was raw and then
put pepper and salt in de sores. If he thought we was too slow in
doin’ anything he would kick us off de groun’ and churn us up
and down.”81 Barclay’s overseer was creative in his cruelty: “Our
punishment depended on de mood of de overseer…De over-seer
would git some coarse cotton cloth to make our work clothes out
of and den he would make dem so narrow we couldn’t hardly
walk.”82
Annie Young recalled another creative albeit brutal
punishment on a neighboring plantation: “Dey didn’t whip our
folks much, but one day I saw a overseer on another place. He
staked a man down with two forked sticks ‘cross his wrist nailed
in de ground and beat him half to death with a hand saw ‘til it
drawed blisters. Den he mopped his back wid vinegar, salt and
pepper. Sometimes dey’d drop dat hot rosin from pine knots on
dose blisters.” 83 Mary James admitted, “Old Silas Randolph
[Master] was a mean man to his slaves especially when drunk. He
and the overseer would always be together, each of whom carried
a whip and upon the least provocation would whip his slaves.”84
Overseers imposed whimsical violence to further assert their
own dominance over the other slaves on the plantation. Charlie
Grant described an instance in which his overseer “Tie de slaves
clear de ground by dey thumbs wid nigger cord en make dem
tiptoe en draw it tight as could be. Pull clothes off dem fore dey
tie dem up. Dey didn’t care nothin bout it. Let everybody look on
at it.”85 Several slaves went so far as to refer to their overseers as
the devil due to their frequent, sadistic punishment. George G.
King stated, “He was born on two-hundred acres of Hell, but the
whitefolks called it Samuel Roll’s plantation…kinder small for a
plantation, but plenty room for that devil overseer to lay on the
lash.”86 When Charley Williams was asked about the afterlife in
his interview, he noted: “I never had no children, and it look lak
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my wife going outlive me, so my mainest hope when I goes on is
seeing Mammy and Pappy and old Master. Old overseer, I speck,
was too devilish mean to be thar!”87
Overseers carried out violence with the tools most readily
available on the plantation and certain to inflict the most pain.
Among the most popular of these instruments were the cat o’ nine
tails. The cat o’nine tails, commonly referred to as the “nine,”
were multi-tailed, knotted masses of leather that varied in length.
Overseers used them to brutally slash the skin of their victims.
“We all hated what they called the ‘nine ninety-nine,’ usually a
flogging until fell over unconscious or begged for mercy,” Dennis
Simms reported.88 Hector Godbold also remembered the use of
the cat o’nine tails: “Sam Watson was a rough old overseer... Sam
Watson come dere and make dat fellow lay down on a plank in da
fence jam en he take dat cat o’nine tail he have tie round his waist
en strike John 75 times. De blood run down off his just like you
see a stream run in dat woods.”89 Katie Rowe’s overseer similarly
utilized the cat o’nine tails: “When he go to whip a nigger he make
him to strip to de waist, and he take a cat-o-nine tails and bring de
blisters, and den bust de blisters wid a wide strap of leather
fastened to a stick handle. I seen de blood running out’n many a
back, all de way from de neck to de waist!”90
When issuing whippings, overseers almost always forced
slaves, men and women alike, to strip off their clothing. Not only
did this tactic exact a more excruciating physical pain, but it also
demeaned the slaves in front of their peers—another form of
psychological control. Alec Pope recalled, “Marster brushed us
sometime, but de overseer most gen’ally done it. I ‘members dey
used to make ‘omans pull up deir skirts and brushed ‘em wid a
horse whup or a hickory.”91 Richard Macks described one slave
on his plantation that refused to allow his owner to whip him.
Macks continued, “the overseer and several others overpowered
the slave, tied him, put him across a hogshead and whipped him
severely for three mornings in succession.” 92 This example—
along with many others—details the combination of both
unpredictable and ritual punishment to both physically and
psychologically subjugate rebellious slaves and re-assert control.
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Master and Mistress Resistance to Overseer Violence
The extreme, sadistic violence carried out by overseers
often stood in direct conflict with the masters’ objectification of
the enslaved. To prevent the damage of their investment, many
masters verbally condemned overseers’ brute violence. Overseers
were acutely aware of the admonitions of their masters, and so
they threatened slaves with death to prevent them from reporting
such violence. Clare C. Young described the death of her cousin
at the hands of an overseer and recalled, “I heard tell one time,
tho’, of de hired man (he was a nigger) an’ de oberseer whuppin’
one of my cousins ‘til she bled; she was jes’ sebenteen years old
an’ was in de fambly way fer de fust time, an’ couldn’ work as
hard as de rest. Nex’ mawnin’ afte’ dat she died. De hired man
tol’ de rest if dey said anything ‘bout it to de marster, he’d beat
dem to death, too, so every’body kep’ quiet an’ quiet an’ de
marster neber knowed.” 93 Minnie Fulkes told a chilling story
worth quoting in full:
Honey, I don’t’ like to talk ‘bout dem times, ‘cause my mother
did suffer misert. You know dar wus an’ overseer who use to tie
mother up in de barn with a rope aroun’ her arms up over he
heard, while she stood on a block. Soon as dey got her tied, dis
block was moved an’ her feet dangled, yo’ know couldn’t tech
de flo’. Dis ol’ man, now, would start beatin’ her nekkid ‘til the
blood run down her back to her heels. I took an’ seed th’ whelps
an’ scars for my own self wid dese here two eyes. After dey had
beat my muma all dey wanted another overseer. Lord, Lord, I
hate white people and de flood waters gwine drown some mo.
Well honey dis man would bathe her in salt and water. Don’t you
kno’ dem places wuz a hurtin’. Um, um. I asked mother, what
she done fer ‘en to beat and do her so? She said, ‘nothin’, tother
than she refused to be wife to dis man. An’ muma say, if he
didn’t treat her dis way a dozen times, it wasn’t nary one. Mind
you, now muma’s marster didn’t know dis wus going on. You
now, if slaves would tell, why dem overseers would kill ‘em.94

Fulkes’s mother refused to marry a man not of her choice, and
thus paid the price for her defiance. Her mother’s failure to reveal
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this severe violence to her master illustrates the broader
psychological fear overseers instilled in the enslaved.
To assuage masters’ concerns, overseers sometimes
justified their violence against slaves when it stemmed from
disobedience to masters’ commands. Dennis Simms explained:
“We had to toe the mark or be flogged with a rawhide whip, and
almost every day there was from two to ten thrashings given on
the plantations to disobedient Negro slaves. When we behaved we
were not whipped, but the overseer kept a pretty close eye on us.
We stuck pretty close to the cabins after dark, for if we were
caught roaming about we would be unmercifully whipped.” 95
Charley Williams described the unpredictable punishments
issued by his overseer for disobedience:
“Our overseer was Mr. Simmons, and he was mighty smart and
had a lot of patience, but he wouldn’t take no talk nor foolishness.
He didn’t whup nobody very often, but he only had to whup ‘em
jest one time! He never did whup a nigger at de time the nigger
done something, but he would wait till evening and have old
Master come and watch him do it. He never whupped very hard
‘cept when he had told a nigger something and promised a
whupping next time and the nigger done it again. Then that
nigger got what he had been hearing ‘bout!”96

Lucy McCullough detailed a severe whipping she received from
her overseer as a child on her Master Ned’s plantation for playing
games in the woods with the other slave children.97 “The woods”
are often mentioned in connection with disobedience and violence
in the narratives. Numerous plantations occupied land next to
rural woods, so slaves typically used this setting as a place of
refuge from the violence and labor of the plantation.
But while overseers abused slaves for failing to follow
their masters’ commands, sometimes overseers were the ones
disregarding the masters’ wishes. For example, while many
masters directed their overseers to teach their slaves the reason
for their punishment, some overseers whipped slaves for no
reason at all. Katie Rowe recalled, “Old man Saunders was de
hardest overseer of anybody. He would git mad and give a
whipping some time and de slave wouldn’t even know what it was
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about.”98 R.S. Taylor echoed, “Marster’s overseer was mean to us
after marster died. Nothing we could do would suit him, and he
whipped the Negroes.” 99 This unpredictable punishment was
perhaps the hardest for slaves to bear psychologically. The
capricious whipping of overseers offered slaves no refuge in good
behavior. “The overseer on Master’s plantation was a mean old
fellow, he carried his gun all the time and would ride a big fine
horse and go from one bunch of slaves to the other,” explained
Octavia George.100 Similarly, Wheeler Gresham mentioned, ““Ef
a overseer got rough an’ wanted to beat a nigger, he had to go
right den and dar. Dem overseer fellows wuz rough anyhow, dey
warn’t our sort of folks.” 101 Hal Huston described his mother
being whipped for no reason by his overseer:
“He never did whip me much ‘cause I was kind of a pet. I worked
up to the Big House, but he sho’ did whip them others. Why, one
day he was beating my mother, and I was too small to say
anything, so my big brother heard her crying and came running,
picked up a chunk and that overseer stopped a’beating her. The
white boy was holding her on the ground and he was whipping
her with a long leather whip. They said they couldn’t teach her
no sense and she said ‘I don’t wanna learn no sense.’”102

Such unwarranted violence did not go unchallenged.
Masters and mistresses alike resisted overseers’ efforts to assert
control, usually in an effort to retain the benevolent, paternalistic
image they aimed to project of themselves. They often stipulated
that overseers could only issue punishments at their discretion and
with their supervision, so as to maintain hierarchical control
themselves. The most common form of resistance by masters and
mistresses was firing the overseer for excessive violence.
Sometimes overseers were even replaced by promoting a slave as
the black overseer. Andy Marion recalled his mistress replacing
his two white overseers with a black overseer: “Miss Mary run
them both off and told marster what she couldn’t see to when he
was away, she’d pick out one of de slaves to see after.” 103
Similarly, Mrs. John Barclay recalled, “One time marster found
out the over-seer was so mean to me, so he discharged him and
released me from duty for awhile.” 104 Salomon Oliver boldly
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declared, “If the slaves were not being treated right – out go the
white overseer. Fired!” 105 “The overseer couldn’t whip the
niggers, except in her [the Mistress] presence, so that she could
see that it wasn’t brutal. She didn’t allow the women to be
whipped at all. When an overseer got rough, she would fire him,”
F.H. Brown additionally remarked.106
Alice Alexander recalled her master firing the overseer for
his lack of control over the enslaved: “We had an overseer back
on Colonel Threff’s plantation and my mother said he was the
meanest man on earth. He’d jest go out in de fields and beat dem
niggers, and my mother told me one day he come out in de field
beating her sister and she jumped on him and nearly beat him half
to death and old Master come up jest in time to see it all and fired
dat overseer. Said he didn’t want no man working for him dat a
woman could whip.”107
In one exceptional case, the mistress fired the overseer and
appointed herself as interim overseer of the plantation. Valley
Perry described her mistress, “Mis’ Lucy”, as an “angel.”108 Perry
juxtaposed the character of Mis’ Lucy with that of her overseer
who she stated, “wus kinder mean ter de slaves, an’ when he
whupped dem dey ‘membered hit ter de longest day dey lived.”109
She recalled that Mis’ Lucy would beg the overseer to temper his
punishments against the slaves and often grab his arm and cry
hysterically to get him to stop. Finally, Perry described, the
overseer complained to the master, Mr. Nat, and threatened to quit
if Mr. Nat “doan make Mis’ Lucy keep outen his business.”110
The overseer and Mr. Nat agreed that each Tuesday Mr. Nat
would take Mis’ Lucy off the plantation so he could whip the
slaves without any disruptions. Perry detailed, however, that one
Tuesday, Mr. Nat and Mis’ Lucy arrived home earlier than
expected. “When dey drives up in de yard de oberseer am so busy
whuppin’ de niggers what has done bad dat he ain’t seed Mis’
Lucy till she am right on him, den she snatch de heavy bullwhip
an’ she strikes him two or three times right in de face… Dat
settled de oberseer’s hash an’ atter he left Mis’ Lucy went ter
doctorin’ cut up backs. Gran’mammy said dat dar wusn’t no more
trouble wid de niggers an’ Mis’ Lucy done all of de punishin’
herself,” concluded Perry.111
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Slave Resistance to Overseer Violence
Masters were not the only figures who contested overseers.
Slaves also employed various forms of resistance against
overseers’ attempts to assert control, in an effort to reclaim their
own agency and dignity. One form of resistance slaves used was
“conjure.” Mattie Logan recalled one “cure for mean overseers”
on the nearby Lewis plantation:
“Get a king snake and put the snake in the overseer’s cabin. Slip
the snake in about, no, not about, but just exactly nine o’clock at
night. Seems like the time was important, why so, I don’t
remember now. That’s what the slaves did. Put in the snake and
out went the overseer. Never no more did he whip the slaves on
that plantation because he wasn’t working there no more! When
he went, when he went, or how he went nobody knows, but they
all say he went. That’s what counted – he was gone!”112

A second way slaves resisted their overseers was by
cooperating with one another. If they could undermine new
overseers’ efforts to assert control, they would never attain full
authority over them. George Womble told his WPA interviewer:
“The slaves knew that whenever Mr. Womble hired a new
overseer he always told the prospect that if he couldn’t handle
the slaves his services would not be needed. The cook had heard
the master tell a prospective overseer this and so whenever a new
one was hired the slaves were quick to see how far they could go
with him. Mr. Womble says that an overseer had to be a very
capable man in order to keep his job as overseer on the Womble
plantation because if the slaves found out that he was afraid of
fighting him (and they did sometimes) they took advantage of
him so much so that the production dropped and the overseer
either found himself trying to explain to his employer or else
looking for another job. The master would never punish a slave
for beating an overseer with his fists stated Mr. Womble.”113

Womble’s recollection demonstrated that the enslaved actively
challenged overseers’ efforts for psychological control. Much of
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the success of the plantation depended on this race between the
enslaved and the overseer to claim control, and Womble
illustrated that the master harbored no qualms about releasing
overseers if they failed to meet the burdens stipulated in their
mutual agreement.
Another common form of resistance among slaves was
running away. “De overseer give all de whippin’s,” described
Fred Brown:
“Sometimes when de nigger gits late, ‘stead of comin’ home and
takin’ de whippin’ him goes to de caves of de river and stays and
jus’ comes in night time for food. When dey do dat, de dawgs is
put after dem and den it am de fight ‘tween de nigger and de
dawg. Jus’ once a nigger kills de dawg with de knife, dat was
close to freedom and it come ‘fore dey ketches him. When dey
whips for runnin’ off, de nigger am tied down over a barrel and
whipped ha’d, till dey draws blood, sometimes.”114

However, the use of bloodhounds as previously detailed severely
limited the chances of successful escape. Hence, slaves’ attempts
to reclaim their agency by running away were rather limited.
Perhaps the least common form of resistance among
slaves was violent resistance. Some slaves sought to reclaim their
agency by countering the violence of the overseer with their own
physical violence. Phillip Evans recounted an instance in which
the overseer provoked tension with his Uncle Dennis. “Who was
de overseers?” Evans repeated, “Mr. Wade Rawls was one and
Mr. Osborne was another. There was another one but ‘spect I
won’t name him, ‘cause him had some trouble wid my Uncle
Dennis. ‘Pears like he insult my aunt and beat her. Uncle Dennis
took it up, beat de overseer, and run off to de woods… After de
‘vestigation they take him to de whippin’ post of de town, tie his
foots, make him put his hands in de stocks, pulled off his shirt,
pull down his britches and whip him terrible.” 115 Ida Henry
recalled her overseer’s attempts to assert his own authority after
her master left for war, stating, “As me Master went to de War de
old overseer tried himself in meanness over de slaves as
seemingly he tried to be important.” 116 Henry related how the
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slaves on her plantation actually killed their overseer for his
attempts to assert psychological control:
“One day de slaves caught him and one held him whilst another
knocked him in de head and killed him…Before de slaves killed
our overseer, he would work ‘em night and day. De slaves was
punished when dey didn’t do as much work as de overseer
wanted ‘em to do. He would lock ‘em in jail some nights without
food and kept ‘em dere all night, and after whipping ‘em de next
morning would only give ‘em bread and water to work on till
noon. When a slave was hard to catch for punishment dey would
make ‘em wear ball and chains. De ball was ‘bout de size of de
head and made of lead.”117

Other examples exist of slaves engaging in violence
against overseers. Martha Bradley detailed her violent resistance
to the sexual advances of her overseer. She stated, “One day I wuz
workin’ in de field and de overseer he come ‘round and say
sumpin’ to me he had no bizness say. I took my hoe and knocked
him plum down. I know I’se done sumpin’ bad so I run to de
bushes. Marster Lucas come and got me and started whoopin’ me.
I say to Marster Lucas whut dat overseer sez to me and Marster
Lucas didn’ hit me no more. Marse Lucas wuz allus good to us
and he wouldn’ let no body run over his niggers.”118 Anna Baker
remembered a story of violence directed at an overseer:
“I recolled a tale my mammy tol’ me ‘bout my gran’pa…
Ever’thing was all right ‘till one o’ dem uppity overseers tried to
act smart. He say he gwine a-beat him. My gran’pappy went
home dat night an’ barred de door. When de overseer an’ some
o’ his frien’s come after him, he say he ain’t gwine a-open dat
door, Dey say if he don’t dey gwine a-break it in. He tell ‘em to
go ‘head. Whilst dey was a-breakin’ in he filled a shovel full o’
red hot coals an’ when dey come in he th’owed it at ‘em. Den
whilst dey was a-hollerin’ he run away. He ain’t never been seen
again to dis good day.”119

Lastly, Sallie Carder recalled her father’s attempt at disobedience
to the overseer, stating, “De only trouble between whites and
blacks on our plantation was when de overseer tied my mother to
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whip her and my father untied her and de overseer shot and killed
him.”120 Carder’s recollection illustrates that even despite the best
efforts of slaves to resist the overseer’s assertions of physical,
sexual, and psychological control, violent resistance had its limits.
However, as demonstrated above, this featured as a common
theme for all types of resistance. While slaves actively resisted
overseers’ control to try and reclaim their agency and dignity,
such resistance often proved futile and was almost always met
with even greater violence from overseers.
Conclusion
This paper has painted a picture of plantation overseers as
ruthless, power-hungry brutes. Yet, it deserves note that on rare
occasions, slaves described having kind overseers. Isaac Stier
confirmed, “‘Us had a overseer on de place, but warn’t mean lak
I’se heard o’ other folks havin’. He was Mr. William Robinson.
He was good to every’body, both white an’ cullud. Folks didn’
min’ workin’ for him, ‘cause he spoke kin’. But dey dassen’ sass
‘im. He was poor. My pappy b’longed to his pa, Mr. John
Robinson. Dat was a nice fam’ly wid sho’ ‘nough ‘ligion. Whilst
dey warn’t rich, dey had learnin’.”121 Similarly, when asked by
her interviewer, “Did the overseers whip you or were they good,”
Rachel Sullivan replied, “Overseers wus good…Dere was
Emmanuel and Mr. DeLoach. Dey couldn’t whup us or treat us
mean.”122 Finally, ex-slave, Anthony Dawson, reported that his
overseers served as conductors on the Underground Railroad:
“Dis boy got out in de big road to walk in de soft sand, and long
come a wagon wid a white overseer and five, six, niggers going
somwhar. Dey stopped and told dat boy to git in and ride. Dat
was de last anybody seen him. Dat overseer and another one was
cotched after awhile, and showed up to be underground
railroaders. Dey would take a bunch of niggers into town for
some excuse, and on de way jest pick up a extra nigger and show
him what to go to git on de ‘railroad system.’”123

Yet even if some overseers proved kind, such behavior was
usually at the behest of masters who frowned upon excessive
“Overseers’ Quest”
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punishment. Moreover, the overwhelming amount of negative
characterizations of overseers compared to positive ones indicates
that thoughtful overseers were few and far between.
Ultimately, the presentation of overseers in the WPA
Narratives dispels the idea that the “caricature” of the overseer is
merely exaggeration, and instead demonstrates that overseers
were hired largely to fit the stereotype of an “evil white man with
a whip.” Overseers utilized both ritual and unpredictable
punishments and behaviors to physically, psychologically, and
sexually control the enslaved. Overseers bore responsibility for a
range of various tasks and duties, and thus were able to exercise
control in almost every aspect of the lives of the enslaved—from
waking them up in the morning to concluding their work at the
end of the day. Both white and black overseers alike turned to
violence as a means of control. Overseers inflicted violence as an
incentive for labor, a punishment for disobedience and running
away, a means of sexual coercion, out of pure sadism, and
sometimes for no reason at all. Such intense efforts for control led
masters, mistresses, and slaves to all exercise their own forms of
resistance. The most successful method employed by masters and
mistresses was firing the overseer and replacing them with a less
violent, sometimes enslaved, overseer. On the other hand, the
enslaved resisted through conjure, cooperation among slaves,
running away, and even violence—all in an effort to regain
agency, dignity, and control. Thus, the sympathetic view of
overseers shared by some modern scholars is unjustified, and the
descriptions of overseers from the mouths of those they sought to
control in the WPA Narratives suggests that this “caricature” of
overseers was largely grounded in reality.
Notes
1

William K. Scarborough, “The Southern Plantation Overseer: A
Reevaluation,” Agricultural History 38 (1964): 13-20.
2
Robert Wayne Webber, “Plantation Overseers and Their World: The
Stereotype, Life and Image,” Masters Abstracts International (2008), 9-15.
3
The WPA Narratives can be found at the Library of Congress site:
https://www.loc.gov/collections/slave-narratives-from-the-federal-writers-

46

The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018)

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol8/iss2/1

46

Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
project-1936-to-1938/about-this-collection/; hereafter cited as LOC WPA, with
the interviewee’s name and state, or volume number and state where the name is
not given.
4
Webber, “Plantation Overseers and Their World.”
5
LOC, WPA.
6
C. Vann Woodward, “History from Slave Sources,” The American Historical
Review 79:2 (1974): 470.
7
Woodward, “History from Slave Sources.”
8
Paul Escott, “The Art and Science of Reading WPA Slave Narratives,” in The
Slave’s Narrative, ed. Charles T. Davis and Henry Louis Gates (New York City:
Oxford University Press, 1985).
9
Woodward, “History from Slave Sources.”
10
Escott, “The Art and Science of Reading WPA Slave Narratives.”
11
For other scholars who discuss the biases and promise of the WPA Narratives,
see Sharon Ann Musher, “Contesting ‘The Way the Almighty Wants It’:
Crafting Memories of Ex-Slaves in the Slave Narrative Collection,” American
Quarterly 53:1 (March 2001); Stephanie Shaw, “Using the WPA Ex-Slave
Narratives to Study the Impact of the Great Depression,” Journal of Southern
History 69:3 (August 2003): 623-658; Lynda M. Hill, “Ex-Slave Narratives: The
WPA Federal Writer’s Project Reappraised,” Oral History 26:1 (Spring 1988):
64-72; David Thomas Bailey, “A Divided Prism: Two Sources of Black
Testimony on Slavery,” Journal of Southern History 46 (August 1980): 381404; Donna J. Spindel, “Assessing Memory: Twentieth-Century Slave
Narratives Reconsidered,” Journal of Interdisciplinary History 27 (Autumn
1996): 247-261; John Blassingame, “Using the Testimony of Ex-Slaves:
Approaches and Problems,” Journal of Southern History 41:4 (November 1975):
473-492; Catherine A. Stewart, Long Past Slavery: Representing Race in the
Federal Writers’ Project (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press,
2016).
12
Charles Joyner, Down by the Riverside: A South Carolina Slave Community,
Anniversary Edition (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 2009), 51.
13
Reverend Silas Jackson, Maryland, LOC WPA.
14
Alec Pope, Georgia, LOC WPA.
15
Daniel William Lucas, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
16
Charlie Grant, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
17
Robert Grinstead, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
18
George Womble, Georgia, LOC WPA.
19
Mary James, Maryland, LOC WPA.
20
Clare C. Young, Mississippi, LOC WPA.
21
Reverend Silas Jackson, Maryland, LOC WPA.
22
Bert Mayfield, Kentucky, LOC WPA.
23
Anthony Dawson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
24
Reverend Silas Jackson, Maryland, LOC WPA.
25
Mary James, Maryland, LOC WPA.

“Overseers’ Quest”
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017

47
47

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 8 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 1
26

Alexander Scaife, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
Reverend Silas Jackson, Maryland, LOC WPA.
28
Andy Marion, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
29
Perry Lewis, Maryland, LOC WPA.
30
Harriet Robinson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
31
William Wiethoff, “Enslaved Africans’ Rivalry with White Overseers in
Plantation Culture: An Unconventional Interpretation,” Journal of Black Studies
36 (2006): 429-455.
32
Mrs. M.S. Fayman, Maryland, LOC WPA.
33
Stephen McCray, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
34
Emma Howard, Alabama, LOC WPA.
35
Hal Hutson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
36
Ben Horry, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
37
Hannah McFarland, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
38
Bert Luster, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
39
Stephen McCray, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
40
Janie Gallman, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
41
Ophelia Whitley, North Carolina, LOC WPA.
42
Andy Marion, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
43
Anna Baker, Mississippi, LOC WPA.
44
Fred Brown, Texas, LOC WPA.
45
Robert Grinstead, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
46
William Wiethoff, “Enslaved Africans’ Rivalry with White Overseers in
Plantation Culture: An Unconventional Interpretation,” Journal of Black Studies
36 (2006): 429-455.
47
Joyner, Down by the Riverside, 68.
48
Adele Frost, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
49
Lizzie Farmer, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
50
Robert Grinstead, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
51
Anthony Dawson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
52
Emma Howard, Alabama, LOC WPA.
53
Annie Young Henson, Maryland, LOC WPA.
54
Richard Macks, Maryland, LOC WPA.
55
Lou Smith, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
56
Anthony Dawson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
57
William Curtis, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
58
Ben Horry, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
59
Ben Horry, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
60
Joyner, Down by the Riverside, 69.
61
Emma Howard, Alabama, LOC WPA.
62
Daniel William Lucas, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
63
Richard Macks, Maryland, LOC WPA.
64
Mary James, Maryland, LOC WPA.
65
Reverend Silas Jackson, Maryland, LOC WPA.
27

48

The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018)

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol8/iss2/1

48

Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)
66

Robert Grinstead, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
Mack Taylor, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
68
Ibid.
69
Sarah Ross, Florida, LOC WPA.
70
Hal Hutson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
71
Hector Godbold, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
72
Louisa Gause, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
73
Mrs. M.S. Fayman, Maryland, LOC WPA.
74
George G. King, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
75
Anna Baker, Mississippi, LOC WPA.
76
Mrs. M.S. Fayman, Maryland, LOC WPA.
77
James Calhart James, Maryland, LOC WPA.
78
Louisa Gause, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
79
George Womble, Georgia, LOC WPA.
Overseers typically utilized one of two basic management systems on the
plantation. The most commonly used management system was known as the
“gang system.” Under the gang system, enslaved field hands were divided into
small groups, known as gangs, under the careful supervision of an overseer or a
driver. The purpose of the gang was to force each field hand to continue labor
until all were discharged from the field. The gang system was considered the
more brutal of the two and offered slaves less autonomy in their labor. Under the
task system, each hand was given a specific daily assignment. Slaves could work
at their own personal pace and quit when their task was complete. Many
overseers utilized the task system to incentivize slaves. Slaves usually preferred
the task system as it required less supervision by overseers and drivers, offered
more autonomy, and allowed slaves to pursue their own personal interests when
their labor was complete. Tasks were allotted based on the age and physical
ability of the slave. Masters and overseers often used a combination of both
systems for different crops. For more information on the distinctions between
gang systems and tasks systems see: Kenneth M. Stampp, Peculiar Institution:
Slavery in the Antebellum South (New York: Vintage, 1989).
80
Alec Pope, Georgia, LOC WPA.
81
Mrs. John Barclay, Texas, LOC WPA.
82
Ibid.
83
Annie Young, Arkansas, LOC WPA.
84
Mary James, Maryland, LOC WPA.
85
Charlie Grant, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
86
George G. King, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
87
Charley Williams, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
88
Dennis Simms, Maryland, LOC WPA.
89
Hector Godbold, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
90
Katie Rowe, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
91
Alec Pope, Georgia, LOC WPA.
92
Richard Macks, Maryland, LOC WPA.
67

“Overseers’ Quest”
Published by W&M ScholarWorks, 2017

49
49

James Blair Historical Review, Vol. 8 [2017], Iss. 2, Art. 1
93

Clare C. Young, Mississippi, LOC WPA.
Minnie Fulkes, Virginia, LOC WPA.
95
Dennis Simms, Maryland, LOC WPA.
96
Charley Williams, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
97
Lucy McCullough, Georgia, LOC WPA.
98
Katie Rowe, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
99
R.S. Taylor, North Carolina, LOC WPA.
100
Octavia George, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
101
Wheeler Gresham, Georgia, LOC WPA.
102
Hal Hutson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
103
Andy Marion, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
104
Mrs. John Barclay, Texas, LOC WPA.
105
Salomon Oliver, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
106
F.H. Brown, Arkansas, LOC WPA.
107
Alice Alexander, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
108
Valley Perry, North Carolina, LOC WPA.
109
Ibid.
110
Ibid.
111
Ibid.
112
Mattie Logan, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
113
George Womble, Georgia, LOC WPA.
114
Fred Brown, Texas, LOC WPA.
115
Phillip Evans, South Carolina, LOC WPA.
116
Ida Henry, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
117
Ibid.
118
Martha Bradley, Alabama, LOC WPA.
119
Anna Baker, Mississippi, LOC WPA.
120
Sallie Carder, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
121
Isaac Stier, Mississippi, LOC WPA.
122
Rachel Sullivan, Georgia, LOC WPA.
123
Anthony Dawson, Oklahoma, LOC WPA.
94

50

The James Blair Historical Review (Spring 2018)

https://scholarworks.wm.edu/jbhr/vol8/iss2/1

50

Mills: The James Blair Historical Review, Volume 8:2 (Spring 2018)

International Waters:
Putting Hawaii Back in the American Civil War
Rebecca Leidenheimer

In February 1864, days before General William Tecumseh
Sherman and his forces entered Jackson, Mississippi, U.S.
President Abraham Lincoln took the time to write a letter to the
newly-crowned king of Hawaii.1 Consoling the monarch on the
death of his brother and predecessor, Lincoln wished him success
in his reign. “Your Majesty may ever firmly rely upon my sincere
sympathy and cordial support,” the President wrote,
acknowledging that American feelings toward Hawaii were “of
almost paternal regard, as well as of sincere friendship and
unchanging interest.”2 Even as the Civil War raged, Lincoln and
his cabinet understood the importance of maintaining American
influence in the Pacific.
Pulitzer Prize-winning historian Steven Hahn writes that
“[telling] a familiar story in an unfamiliar way...challenges our
understanding of the past and the future to which it gave rise.”3
By centering the experience of Hawaii during the Civil War, this
paper aims to illuminate the global implications of the conflict,
tying together both Manifest Destiny in the Pacific and the “Age
of Revolutions” rocking the Atlantic world. Hawaiian scholar
Rhoda E. A. Hackler asserts that with the outbreak of the Civil
War, American Secretary of State William Seward “presumably
did not have time for the sort of problems which arose in far off
Hawai’i.” 4 Yet Seward also signed Lincoln’s 1864 letter to
Kamehameha V, revealing that both the Secretary of State and the
President were tracking the Hawaiian situation and aware of the
death of Kamehameha IV. Historian Don H. Doyle argues that
the American Civil War “must be understood within the context
of alternating swells of revolutionary hope and reactionary
oppression that radiated through the Atlantic world in the Age of
“International Waters”
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Revolution.” 5 In Doyle’s 2015 The Cause of All Nations: An
International History of the Civil War, the kingdom of Hawaii
receives only a brief parenthetical mention despite its close ties to
the U.S. and the broader world system. As Steven Hahn argues,
“the Atlantic framework greatly underestimates the importance of
the Pacific” in nineteenth century events. 6 Putting Hawaii, a
Pacific island kingdom with a large American population, back in
the Civil War connects these two narratives and draws attention
to the ways that the Atlantic and Pacific worlds influenced each
other.
Scholars of the Civil War's effect on Hawaii have focused
primarily on its economic impact, crediting the conflict with
dealing a death blow to the New England-based American
whaling industry, previously the islands' primary source of capital.
In the years before the Civil War, whaling had been on the
decline—the discovery of petroleum in 1859 made whale oil
impractical and expensive, and overfishing led to scarcity.7 Then
came the war, and with the combination of Confederate piracy
(destroying over $1 million in ships and $500,000 in whale oil)
and the sinking of whalers by the Union Navy to blockade the
port of Charleston, the industry was brought to its knees.8
As whaling died, sugar cultivation became increasingly
profitable in Hawaii. American demand for Hawaiian sugar rose
since the Union was cut off from the supply of Louisiana’s
plantations. During the Civil War, the number of Hawaiian sugar
plantations increased almost threefold, and from 1860 to 1866
sugar exports went from less than a million and a half pounds per
year to over seventeen million pounds per year. 9 Significantly,
most of the sugar planters in Hawaii were Americans of New
England origin. Forty years after the war, this disparity was even
more pronounced; Americans “owned four acres of land for every
one owned by a native.”10 The growing postbellum power of the
American sugar barons proved overwhelming to the Hawaiian
monarchy. By 1893, their influence enabled them to depose
Queen Liliuokalani and form the Republic of Hawaii, which U.S.
President William McKinley annexed in 1898. Historian Jeffrey
Allen Smith notes the irony of the Civil War’s economic impact
on the islands: “the war that strengthened the United States as a
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country laid the foundation for the destruction of the kingdom of
Hawaii.”11
While important, the transition from whales to sugar
should not dominate discussion of Hawaii’s role in the Civil War.
Hahn notes that “it is impossible to grasp the significance of many
of the important events of the nineteenth century...without
recognizing the Pacific as an American destiny, real and
imagined.” 12 Lincoln and Seward harbored interest in
maintaining American influence in Hawaii not only for the sake
of the sugar trade, but also because of the kingdom’s location. By
1853, “the importance of the islands to the United States had
increased due to the U.S. presence on the Pacific Coast, the
prospect of a new and more stable government in China, and the
opening of Japan to commerce.”13 Although historians frequently
limit their discussion of the Civil War to its domestic dimensions,
the conflict occurred in a time of U.S. expansion and growing
influence on the world stage. Both Lincoln and Seward
understood that the Pacific links America was forging needed
protection.
As a monarchy, Hawaii had a stake in what Ramón
Castilla, the president of Peru, called a “war of the crowns against
the Liberty Caps,” in which European monarchs would try to
reassert their global authority in the face of the demonstrated
failure of America’s “republican experiment.” 14 The kings of
Hawaii during the Civil War period (Kamehameha IV [reigned
1856-1863] and Kamehameha V [reigned 1863-1872]) firmly
sought to align themselves with the European “crowns” rather
than the American “liberty caps,” who posed more of a threat to
Hawaiian sovereignty.
While Hawaii officially declared
neutrality in the U.S. Civil War, it is important to note that “as the
old European regimes had an interest in the failure of America's
experiment in democracy, so too did the King of Hawaii and the
political elite who served him.”15
Historians have debated why King Kamehameha IV
waited until August 1861 to declare Hawaii’s neutrality—and it
was not until September that the king bothered to officially
publish his proclamation of neutrality in a newspaper.16 Scottishborn Robert Crichton Wyllie, the kingdom’s foreign minister for
“International Waters”
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two decades, believed that the Confederacy would eventually win
independence. 17 Yet recognizing the Confederacy would be
dangerous given the overwhelmingly pro-Union American
presence in the islands. 18 Thus, Wyllie instead advocated for a
closer alliance with Great Britain to counter the strength of
American influence. Wyllie worked tirelessly to garner respect
for Hawaii on the international stage. The Hawaiian Ministry of
Foreign Affairs was a busy place despite its size: a Russian visitor
in 1860 described how "all the walls of the single room housing
the ministry were lined with books, and there were piles of papers
in the corners and on the tables...piles of papers were lying on the
floor. Wyllie presided amidst all this in his dress uniform..."19 Led
by Wyllie, Hawaii actively cultivated international ties,
determined not to be subsumed by American interests.
One of the ways in which Hawaii tried drawing itself
closer to the English monarchy, in particular, was through
religion. American missionaries had been a constant presence in
the islands since the 1820s, and wielded significant social
influence. Hawaiian nobility, including future kings and queens,
received education at American missionary schools—accounting
perhaps for the “paternal regard” referred to by Lincoln in his
1864 letter. The well-traveled anglophile Kamehameha IV,
however, thought Episcopalianism was “more compatible with
monarchical government” than the American missionaries’
Congregationalism. 20 His brother Lot, later Kamehameha V,
recalled in 1870 that “we thought, get England to be interested in
us by means of her Church….and she will begin to learn more of
us and take more interest in us which well fostered will ripen into
a great friendship,” a counterweight to Lincoln’s reminder of
Americans’ “sincere friendship and unchanging interest.”21 The
Hawaiian royal family also developed a close relationship with
Great Britain’s Queen Victoria. Indeed, she was the godmother of
the tragically short-lived Crown Prince of Hawaii (who died in
August 1862 at the age of four) as well as a personal
correspondent of Kamehameha IV’s wife, Queen Emma.22
American racial ideology and the perceived greater
tolerance across the Atlantic contributed to the Hawaiian
monarchy’s desire to align itself with Great Britain. As a young
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prince in 1850, Kamehameha IV had traveled to the United States
and found himself subject to American racial prejudices. While
boarding a train in Washington, D.C., he was told to move by a
conductor who did not know his royal status and assumed he was
African-American and therefore in the “wrong,” white passengers
only, carriage. The prince wrote in his journal that this was “the
first time that I ever received such treatment, not in England or
France, or anywhere else. But in this country I must be treated
like a dog to go & come at an Americans bidding.”23 Americans
in Hawaii shared American racist beliefs: Alexander J. Cartwright,
a prominent leader of the Union cause and the chairman of the
American Patriotic Fund in Honolulu, 24 “spoke publicly and
habitually of ‘damned black kanakas [Native Hawaiians]’...by
which he meant all Hawaiians from the royal family down.” 25
During the Civil War, Native Hawaiian soldiers who served the
Union did so in segregated regiments.26 Such American attitudes
stood in contrast to Kamehameha IV’s experience in England,
which he found more free of racial prejudices.27
As Kamehameha IV drew his monarchy closer to Great
Britain, Lincoln and Seward took steps to maintain American
influence in the islands. They recalled U.S. Commissioner to the
Hawaiian Islands Thomas Dyer and replaced him with James
McBride in March 1863. McBride’s position was elevated to
Minister Resident of the United States,28 making him the highestranking foreign official in the Islands.29 In 1861, the New York
Times warned its readers that “the Powers of the Old World are
flocking to the feast from which the scream of our eagle has
hitherto scared them.” 30 No doubt by promoting McBride,
Lincoln and Seward aimed to keep the American eagle screaming,
a message to other foreign powers in Hawaii that America’s
influence would not wane.
The American Civil War served as a warning to the
Hawaiian nobility about how a nation could be torn asunder from
within. In 1864 King Kamehameha V, an “uncompromising
nativist,” decided it was time for a new constitution, thanks in part
to the bloody events in America.31 Like many European monarchs
in the wake of the Civil War, Kamehameha V saw American-style
democracy as dangerous and in need of curtailment. Manley
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Hopkins, British consul general in Hawaii, wrote that the purpose
of the new 1864 constitution was “to destroy the radical element
in the [previous] constitution, to base electoral privilege on a
property qualification, and to give a larger place in the State to the
king, allowing him to govern as well as reign.”32
At the constitutional convention, chief David Kalakaua,
who would become king ten years later, listened as another
delegate gave an impassioned defense of American-style
universal suffrage. To make his point, the delegate argued that
widespread poverty in Great Britain could be blamed on that
country’s limited voting rights. Kalakaua responded that while
the man had mentioned Britain’s misery, he “forgot to say
anything of the state of things in America, where universal
suffrage did exist, and which was one cause of the present war.”33
In an effort to strike a blow at American influence in the islands,
the new constitution contained a stern reminder that “The King
conducts his government for the common good; and not for the
profit, honor, or private interest of any one man, family, or class
of men among His subjects.”34 In the previous 1852 constitution,
which had been heavily influenced by American missionaries,
this article contained an additional clause which read: “Therefore
in making laws for the nation, regard shall be had to the protection,
interest and welfare not only the King, the Chiefs, and rulers, but
of all people alike.” 35 By removing this final clause,
Kamehameha V and his government reasserted the supremacy of
the monarch and subtly turned the article into a rebuke of
American influence.
An intriguing footnote to Hawaii’s involvement in the
Civil War is the postbellum activity of Samuel Chapman
Armstrong, one of the few Hawaiian-born sons of American
missionaries who fought in the conflict. (Scholars have noted that
most Hawaiians who entered the war were kanakas,36 including a
few pressed into service on Confederate raiders.37) During the war,
Armstrong commanded an all-black regiment in the Union Army.
In 1868, he founded the Hampton Institute (later Hampton
University) in Virginia, designed to teach newly-freed AfricanAmericans technical and agricultural skills in a Christian setting.
Armstrong said “it meant something...perhaps to the ex-slaves of
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America, that...there was worked out in the Hawaiian Islands the
problem of the emancipation, enfranchisement, and Christian
civilization of a dark-skinned Polynesian people in many respects
like the negro race.”38 Hampton alumnus Booker T. Washington
wrote that “many of the ideas and much of the inspiration
[Armstrong] used to such good effect in this country, he got in
Hawaii.”39
Hawaiian historian John P. Rosa insists that “the Pacific
World was firmly linked by traders, merchants, missionaries,
whalers, planters, and laborers to the Atlantic World and the rest
of the globe by the end of the nineteenth century.”40 I would go
further to argue that these links were evident by the American
Civil War. To Lincoln’s government, Hawaii represented a
gateway to Asia as well as a supplier of valuable goods such as
sugar, wool, and meat to new states on the American west coast.41
To the Hawaiian monarchy, the events of the American Civil War
encouraged stronger ties with Great Britain to curb American
influence and avoid the pitfalls of universal suffrage and
republicanism. At the same time, the Civil War changed the
foundation of Hawaii’s economy from whaling to sugar
cultivation—a shift that would ultimately undermine the
monarchy. Additionally, American conceptions of race and how
they were refracted in the experience of Hawaiians helped shape
not only Hawaiian reactions to the Civil War, but even U.S.
Reconstruction via Armstrong’s Hampton Institute. By focusing
the spotlight on Hawaii’s role in the Civil War, we illuminate
profound connections between the nineteenth-century Pacific and
Atlantic and expand our notions of the Civil War’s international
impact.
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Foes, Friends, and Fighting for Freedom: The
United States, Soviet Union, and Cuba in the
Southern African Regional Conflict, 1975-1988
Erik Roberts

Introduction
The regional conflict in southern Africa reflected a
conglomeration of domestic issues and international tensions in
the 1970s and 1980s. Domestically, Marxist and conservative
factions in Angola waged civil war in the aftermath of
decolonization. Tensions between black South Africans and the
minority government grew violent in the mid-1970s.
Internationally, South Africa sought to impose dominance over
Namibia, Angola, and other countries to thwart threats to its
apartheid government. To establish its role as the regional
hegemon, South Africa occupied Namibia in 1915. Nationalistic
sentiments in Namibia rose in the 1960s, making the occupation
increasingly contentious. Out of fear that a government
unfriendly to South Africa could take root in Angola, the South
African Defense Forces (SADF) invaded Angola in 1975. The
regional conflict in southern Africa consisted of these domestic
and international dynamics.
The United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba added
another layer to the international nature of this conflict, as this
area developed into an ideological battleground. Eager to gain
influence in southern Africa, the Soviet Union supported the
Marxist faction in Angola and opposed South African
adventurism. The United States, keen to stymie Soviet influence,
ardently supported South Africa and the conservative National
Union for the Total Independence of Angola (UNITA). Cuba, too,
entered the conflict to protect the newly decolonized Angola from
foreign encroachment and support Namibian independence. The
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conflicts in Angola and Namibia were initially predicated on
independence and self-determination for Angola and Namibia.
However, the region quickly became another opportunity for the
Cold War superpowers to promote their respective systems.
The regional conflict was illustrative of Cold War
pressures as a whole. Heightening and lessening of tensions
between the superpowers reverberated in southern Africa. During
the 1970s and early 1980s, the superpowers were very
antagonistic, so they supplied their clients in southern Africa with
tangible support—arms, military strategy, and trade. Though the
regional conflict proved comparatively less violent in the late
1970s and early 1980s than in 1975-1976 or 1986-1988, tensions
remained high. Then, when the superpowers became more
agreeable during the late 1980s, especially regarding intervention
in the Third World, enhanced relations helped bring an end to this
regional conflict. In addition, Cuba’s unflinching commitment
and military might in the region established Cuba as the leader of
the negotiations that ended the conflict. Its strength in the region
facilitated the end of the conflict by cultivating changes in the
U.S.-Soviet relationship. The newfound relationship of trust
between the superpowers would allow the United States to be an
effective mediator in the negotiations that brought about the end
of the conflict in southern Africa.
Part One. Doused with Kerosene: The Inception of the
Regional Conflict in Southern Africa and Superpower
Involvement
Initial Engagement
1975 marked a critical year in the decolonization of
southern Africa. After nearly a decade and a half of fighting
between the Portuguese colonizers and The Republic of Angola,
the fall of the Portuguese Estado Novo regime led to the country’s
withdrawal from southern Africa. In Angola, independence was
not solely an occasion for celebration; though free from colonial
rule, Angola suffered from internal strife as three factions divided
the country. Coupled with the rise of Namibian nationalism after
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half a century of South African occupation, this development
made southern Africa a region rife with internal tensions.1
However, the rise of nationalism in southern Africa was
influenced by global movements. The People’s Movement for the
Liberation of Angola (MPLA) represented the Marxist faction
that vied for power in Angola after Portugal’s withdrawal.
Heavily influenced by the Soviet Union, Agostinho Neto—
former member of the Portuguese Communist Party and leader of
the MPLA—sought Soviet support in the struggle for control of
Angola against the National Union for the Total Independence of
Angola (UNITA) and the National Liberation Front of Angola
(FLNA). Eager to strengthen an already strong Marxist faction in
a region with many burgeoning Marxist parties hoping for
international aid, Soviet General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev
offered support to the MPLA. It seemed geopolitically prudent to
Brezhnev to establish a stronghold in the region. Neto and his
successor, José Eduardo dos Santos, found a partner in the Soviets
from the onset of the Angolan Civil War.2
The United States involved itself in the early conflict in
southern Africa as well. In fact, both the U.S. and the USSR
proved active participants in the events in Angola even before
South Africa, the regional hegemon, invaded Angola. The Ford
administration had authorized covert arms shipments to the
FLNA as early as January 1975 out of fear that the Soviet Union
would escalate its commitment to the MPLA. Ford worried that if
the Soviet Union gained influence in Angola, it could spread
Marxism-Leninism to numerous other newly decolonized
countries in Africa. Even before the first shots were fired, this
conflict was steeped in Cold War tensions.3
As the power of the MPLA rose in Angola, the United
States and South Africa grew increasingly fearful of the potent
Marxist doctrine in Africa. The South African government in
Pretoria “feared that the USSR had a grand design to bring all
southern Africa within its sphere of influence.”4 At the behest of
the CIA and Henry Kissinger, Secretary of State for U.S.
President Gerald Ford, South Africa intervened in Angola on
October 14, 1975, aiming to topple the MPLA regime. The
invasion failed miserably—Angolan and Cuban forces quickly
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repelled South Africa. The conflict became truly regional with
South Africa’s attack on Angola, as this was the first armed clash
since Portugal left Angola. In a memorandum to President Ford
in late December 1975, National Security Advisor Brent
Scowcroft held out hope that the Soviets would show restraint in
southern Africa, but nonetheless acknowledged that Moscow was
“willing to go a significant distance to support an MPLA victory”
to cement a Marxist influence in the region. 5 As détente failed in
the mid and late 1970s, America increasingly sought to thwart the
spread of Marxism. The United States prepared to increase its
involvement in this conflict, and the USSR did the same.6
Though the level of commitment from America and the
Soviet Union increased, the most direct involvement came from
Cuba. Starting in 1965, Cuba sent material aid, military strategists,
and even troops to Angola, among other newly decolonized
African nations. Its intention was purely ideological; Castro
genuinely cared about “aiding [Angola, Mozambique, and others]
in their struggle for independence.”7 He sent thousands of troops
to stymie the South African invasion in 1976. Cuba would remain
in southern Africa throughout the conflict to protect Angola and
Namibia and try to counter South Africa’s influence. In terms of
manpower, materiel, and ideology, Cuba became the most
committed foreign power in the regional conflict.8
Quiet Phase
After the initial South African invasion of Angola,
domestic conflicts increased in importance. Inter-factional
violence proved quite prevalent in Angola and Namibia between
1976-1985. Even though much of the violence during this period
appeared domestic, the interconnectedness of the future of
Angola’s leadership and South Africa’s continued occupation of
Namibia transformed these domestic clashes into regional ones.
As these conflicts persisted and intensified in this span, both the
Soviet Union and United States held an “almost apocalyptic fear
of the consequences if the opponent won.”9 Each feared a shift in
the global balance of power if their adversary gained influence in
the region. President Jimmy Carter’s desire to let the southern
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African nations “solve their problems without outside
interference” reflected a mere platitude as America continued
covert assistance to the FLNA and then to UNITA when the
factions merged. 10 The Soviets became the preferred arms
supplier for SWAPO, the dominant paramilitary group in
Namibia, and the Cubans sent military training instructors and
troops to assist the MPLA in Angola. Just as the United States felt
the need to respond to Soviet commitment, the Soviet Union acted
reflexively to American overtures. A victory for UNITA and
South Africa represented an achievement for capitalism and the
West. The opposite was true for an MPLA win. When the
Americans committed resources, the Soviets felt they needed to
respond with increased commitment of their own. Soviet Deputy
Foreign Minister L.F. Illichev charged that the “rising threat of
neocolonialist…maneuvers by Western powers” in Tanzania,
Zambia, Mozambique, and Angola prompted the Soviet Union to
redouble its commitment in arms to the MPLA and others. 11
Mutual distrust caused both superpowers to increase involvement
in the far south of Africa.12
This fear proved emblematic of the superpowers’ Third
World dynamic. Both countries were bent towards the goal of
modernizing world order with their system of governance and
economics—though they of course diverged on which system
could bring about a prosperous modernity. Moreover, they each
sought to prevent their adversary from spreading what each
country viewed as a fundamentally destructive system. In the case
of southern Africa, the desire to spread ideology and prevent the
enemy from doing the same caused both nations to deepen their
involvement.
Ronald Reagan’s election in 1980 further strained the
tense U.S.-Soviet relationship. An ardent anti-Communist since
his days as president of the Screen Actors Guild, Reagan brought
blustering rhetoric and deep cynicism towards the Soviet Union
to the White House. He was much more eager to engage in
regional conflict than Carter; the Carter administration often
begrudgingly undertook its commitment to southern Africa.
Given the escalation of Soviet commitment and the growing
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Cuban military presence, the adversarial East vs. West dynamic
forced Carter to respond.
Regan, unlike Carter, actively engaged and supported
South Africa as a means of opposing Communism. The apartheid
government in Pretoria abhorred communism because it had been
attracting wide appeal among black South Africans since 1921.
Empowering the black majority with a legitimate political
structure and purpose posed a grave threat to the existence of
apartheid. The minority government required obeisance from the
majority to survive. Thus, Pretoria repeatedly rooted out
communism within its borders and zealously opposed Marxist
encroachment in neighboring countries. Despite its racial politics,
Reagan readily supported the staunchly anti-communist, white
government in Pretoria to diminish Soviet influence in a region of
newly independent countries.13
Assistant Secretary of State Chester A. Crocker was the
primary formulator of U.S. policy towards southern Africa within
the Reagan administration. A Georgetown professor of Foreign
Service, Crocker brought a scholarly background, pragmatism,
and years of experience analyzing American foreign policy to
bear on the region. His preferred policy formulations,
constructive engagement and linkage, facilitated a more active
foreign policy stance. Constructive engagement sought to engage
with the minority government in South Africa to foster productive
business and governmental relationships with the goal of
strengthening the capitalist beacon of southern Africa. Crocker
hoped that engaging with Pretoria in this way would create
positive relationships that would position America to push South
African Prime Minister P.W. Botha’s government to undergo
reforms and end apartheid.14
Linkage, on the other hand, pertained to South Africa’s
occupation of Namibia, one of the key contentious dynamics that
sustained the regional conflict. Having conquered Namibia from
Germany in 1915, South Africa subjected Namibia to apartheid
and tied the country’s economy to South Africa’s. Pretoria
established “a militarized police” under “an unelected
administrator” to control Namibia. As Namibian nationalism
grew in strength in the 1960s and 1970s, the United Nations,
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SWAPO, and other organizations challenged South Africa’s
occupation. International pressure continued to grow in the 1970s.
As it did, South Africa’s hold on Namibia became increasingly
tenuous.15
The doctrine of linkage accepted that the 1978 UN
Resolution 435 for Namibian independence served as the most
realistic, unbiased option to deal with Namibia. Knowing that
international pressure to support the resolution was increasing,
Crocker tied the support of Namibia’s freedom to that of Angola;
he would advise South Africa to withdraw its colonial regime
from Namibia on the condition that Cuban troops left Angola.
Crocker wanted to promote majority rule in Namibia and to
“[counter] Soviet-Cuban adventurism.”16 Crocker endeavored to
further American interests by helping South Africa emerge from
the regional isolation it had experienced on account of Namibian
occupation and the failed invasion of Angola in 1975. Overseeing
the execution of Resolution 435 while removing Cuban troops
from Angola would reduce the threat of a communist takeover in
southern Africa.17
Crocker’s implementation of constructive engagement
and linkage became a discreet affair. In a coordinated effort
between Crocker, CIA Director Bill Casey, Secretaries of State
Alexander Haig and George Shultz, and National Security
Advisor William Clark, the execution of diplomacy with South
Africa was “purposefully kept out of the public gaze.”18 As South
Africa became increasingly reviled in the United States Congress,
the Reagan administration attempted to engage without drawing
attention to the relationship. Crocker rightly feared that his ability
to execute diplomacy in southern Africa would be jeopardized if
the public knew the extent to which he hoped to interact with the
apartheid government. The executive branch’s engagement
successfully flew under the radar since the fighting in the region
receded in the early 1980s, so southern Africa had faded from the
public interest.
For Reagan’s first term, constructive engagement and
linkage continued without a significant challenge. Despite hopes
for increased U.S.-Soviet trade during Reagan’s first term,
mistrust and tension between the two superpowers remained high.
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Southern Africa reflected this tension; as the superpowers’
relationship deteriorated in the late 1970s and early 1980s, the
impasse among South Africa, Namibia, the Angolan factions, and
Cuba deepened. Nearly a decade of rising tensions made the
region susceptible to hot war at any moment.19
Part Two. Set Aflame: Tensions, Bullets, and the Settlement of
the Regional Conflict in Southern Africa, 1985-1988
A Shift in Perception of South Africa
Mark Mathabane grew up in Alexandra, one of apartheid
South Africa’s most notorious townships. His youth was
characterized by feeling “abandoned and betrayed by a world
that…seemed to hold out nothing to [him] but hunger, pain,
violence and death.”20 Growing up, he lived in constant fear of
police raids in the middle of the night in which enforcement
officers would assiduously searched for his mother whose
“pass”—her personal identification booklet—was incomplete.
His mother often hid in a dresser or fled out of a window. If she
were caught, the authorities would take Mark’s father to tribal
lands in rural South Africa or Namibia to undertake months of
hard labor to pay off her debt. This vicious cycle plagued
townships. Arbitrary pass laws ruled the land for which
compliance was necessary to get a job, but jobs remained
unavailable to those without proper passes. This treatment drove
Mark to leave South Africa, but many others in Mark’s position
opted to join paramilitary groups to oppose the minority
government. 21
In 1984-1985, township residents revolted against the
government in a series of uprisings in South Africa. People like
Mark’s friends could no longer contain their frustration over the
lack of opportunity and constant degradation that the apartheid
system brought upon black people. Black South Africans
violently rebelled against the white government’s pass laws and
constant surveillance, just as they did in the 1976 Soweto
Township Uprising. Prime Minister Botha issued a State of
Emergency in 1985 in response to the rise of clashes between
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township residents and enforcement officers. The South African
government heavily deployed its police force and military to
townships across the country, brutally suppressing the revolt and
killing many of its citizens. The white government exerted control
over its black citizenry, creating a public spectacle of violence. It
reminded the world that the government in South Africa was a
repressive, racist regime.22
The Reagan administration responded minimally to the
outbreak of violence in South Africa. Though Crocker, Shultz,
and Reagan all knew of the ferocious suppression of the uprisings,
they did not want to take harsh economic action for fear of
causing negative externalities for black South Africans. In their
view, sanctions would further alienate South Africa from the
global trade market, which would most directly affect blacks.
Constricting South Africa’s access to markets and to capital
would result in fewer available jobs, and blacks would be the first
to lose their incomes. Politically, they feared that reproaching
Pretoria would squander their ability to engage constructively
with the country’s leaders. Condemning Botha and cutting off
political ties would effectively let Pretoria “off the hook” without
giving the United States a chance to use diplomacy to influence
South Africa’s policies. Secretary Shultz described this logic in
1986 to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman
Richard Lugar saying, “The consequences of a lack of action are
terrible to contemplate. So even though the probability [of
pressuring the South African government to abandon apartheid]
is low, it seems to me that we have to work with that
probability.” 23 This was consistent with Reagan’s Third World
policy in which he, as Duke Professor Hal Brands said, favored
the “ability to blunt Soviet geopolitical momentum” even if that
meant partnering with human rights abusers.24 The administration
sacrificed taking an immediate moral stand for a long-term
strategy that required engagement.25
The administration knew, however, that it needed to take
at least some action to respond to the repression in South Africa.
Reagan and his team attempted to denounce Pretoria while
maintaining their relationship and avoiding damage to black
South Africans. Continuing quiet diplomacy would reinforce the
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sentiment that the administration tacitly supported the apartheid
government, so Reagan took measures to reassure Congress and
the American public that it condemned apartheid. He recalled U.S.
Ambassador Herman Nickel in June 1985 and issued Executive
Order 12532, which applied light sanctions to Pretoria three
months later. With these actions, the administration sought to
preempt congressional action, which it assumed would have been
more drastic than their light reprimand. Reagan, Crocker, and
Shultz hoped that these concrete measures, along with a shift to
clearer rhetoric outlining their intentions in South Africa, would
mollify Congress and the American people.26
Before the township uprisings, Congress did not impede
the administration’s diplomatic mission. Congress’ overall
foreign policy making power was in decline through much of
Reagan’s presidency. This reflected a sharp break from the
assertive character of Congress in the mid-1970s. An intellectual
movement in Congress called “new internationalism” fought to
build foreign policy making prowess in response to executive
overreach towards the end of the Vietnam War. New
internationalists “attempted to use congressional power to remake
American foreign policy, abandoning… [the] military-centered
anti-Communism of the Cold War era” in favor of “promoting
human rights and democracy overseas.” 27 Starting in the early
1980s, the trend of the new internationalists seemed to falter as
the administration took control of foreign policy. The July 1985
repeal of the Clark Amendment, which allowed the executive to
uninhibitedly provide extended aid to Jonas Savimbi and UNITA,
seemed to corroborate the rollback of congressional foreign
policy power which the new internationalists worked to build in
the 1970s.28
By the second half of 1985, however, Congress began to
reclaim control of foreign policy. Influenced by interest groups as
well as the American public, Congress responded severely to the
crackdown. Senators condemned apartheid for “state supported
mass executions” and enacting arcane security laws that were
“not legal and they sure [were] not the way to promote security.”29
Members of Congress often employed the rhetoric of human
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rights, and they condemned engaging, however constructively,
with a racist regime.30
In October 1986, Congress revealed its unwillingness to
let the administration continue its engagement with South Africa.
It would no longer tolerate supporting a government that only a
fraction of Americans agreed to support. Following the new
internationalists’ lead, Congress banded together behind a
stronger sanctions package called the Comprehensive AntiApartheid Act. Congress intended to undermine the South
African government and provide various forms of aid to victims
of apartheid. Legislators defiantly passed the bill over a
presidential veto on October 1986. This reflected a clear shift
away from what Congress broadly considered a foreign policy
failure in constructive engagement. Constructive engagement had
not achieved any moderation of the South African government,
and the regional conflict remained tense (and expensive); thus,
Congress wanted to develop a new strategy. Its dramatic
reclamation of foreign policy power was emblematic of a shift
away from support for the South African regime and towards
reconciliation in southern Africa.31
Cuba’s southern African policy was further validated as
South Africa descended into violence and repression. Cuba sent
troops to Angola in response to the South African invasion in
1975 that America privately supported. Fidel Castro possessed a
fervent ideological drive to protect decolonized Angola from
colonial aggression. Though the initial turnaround of South
African forces in 1975-1976 was successful, Cuba maintained a
presence in Angola because the South African government
continued to occupy Namibia, repress its own black citizens, and
provide aid to UNITA.32
Cuba found its presence in Angola even more necessary
as the township uprisings further proved the intransigence and
harshness of P.W. Botha and his government. Pretoria’s
intensification of its repressive practices proved it was
unresponsive to the pressure that Reagan’s administration applied.
South African conduct vindicated Cuba’s presence. Cuban forces
could not leave Angola while Pretoria displayed aggression and
Washington supplied aid to UNITA. Increased repression at home
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coupled with two waves of South African attacks on Angola
exemplified the rise in South Africa’s hostility. CIA Director
Casey corroborated that South Africa’s behavior was unruly when
he surmised that even pressure to curtail repression from the white
business community within South Africa made “little perceptible
effect on Botha.” 33 These actions led to what “Pretoria’s
Republican supporters in the administration and on the Hill feared
most:” Castro more than tripled his troop count in Angola to
50,000 men. 34 Adding legitimacy to the Cuban cause justified
increased involvement in the region over the course of the 1980s.
The Cubans’ impact on the conflict grew alongside their troop
numbers. South Africa had reignited the flame in the region with
increased violence.35
A New Day in the Soviet Union
The trajectory of the Cold War was forever changed when
Mikhail Sergeyevich Gorbachev took office as the general
secretary of the Soviet Union in 1985. Though his first two years
in office did not represent a stark departure from previous Soviet
leaders, starting in 1987 Gorbachev took steps that fundamentally
altered the superpower dynamic and Soviet commitment to Third
World conflicts. Abiding by a framework of ‘new thinking’ in
Soviet diplomacy, Gorbachev exhibited his ideological
commitment to ending Soviet involvement in regional conflicts.
Vladislav Zubok, an influential historian of Soviet foreign
policy, describes Gorbachev’s transformation from another
conservative Soviet leader to a genuine reformer. Zubok claims
that the combination of “the deterioration of the Soviet economy”
and his “romantic notions of international affairs” pushed
Gorbachev to institute new foreign policy conceptions. 36
Specifically, Gorbachev genuinely wanted to engage with Reagan
and forge a new relationship with the United States. He also
wished to scale back Soviet commitment in the Third World and
focus on domestic improvement. As the Soviet system
deteriorated in the 1980s, Gorbachev came to appreciate that
Third World involvement strained the already declining Soviet
economy. Gorbachev represented a generational turnover in
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Soviet leadership, as he was less scarred by the German invasion
in World War II than his predecessors. He also proved adaptable
to developments in geopolitics and intent on improving affairs.
This leadership from the general secretary was critical to relaxing
tensions in southern Africa.37
‘New thinking’ had profound effects on U.S.-Soviet
relations. Gorbachev gradually reformulated his views on foreign
policy as his relationship with Reagan developed and the Soviet
economy worsened. Through a growing relationship of trust
fostered by personal interaction at their multiple summits,
Gorbachev came to see the U.S. as a partner rather than a foe in
the Third World. He realized that the United States did not have
the sinister designs that made former Soviet leaders nervous. This
helped facilitate Gorbachev’s changing perception of Soviet
security. The Kremlin did not feel the same encirclement or threat
from the United States that had previously sustained Cold War
anxieties for decades. This propelled Gorbachev to seek ways to
withdraw from regional military conflicts without damaging
Soviet prestige. He believed that “progress on these issues would
be of mutual benefit” to both the United States and the Soviet
Union; the destructiveness of “zero-sum diplomacy was nearing
its end.”38 Thus, Gorbachev believed that a partnership with the
United States could actually improve the Soviet situation, rather
than imperil it. This allowed for a changed dynamic between the
U.S. and the USSR.39
For the Reagan administration to believe that the “evil
empire” had actually changed, actions needed to corroborate
words. A clear indication that the doctrine of ‘new thinking’
would have a profound effect came on December 8, 1987, when
President Reagan and Secretary Gorbachev signed the INF treaty
at the Washington Summit. This agreement eliminated an entire
class of nuclear weapons from each country’s arsenal. The INF
treaty benefitted Gorbachev by allowing him to begin cutting
military expenditures, and both leaders enjoyed a further
improved security environment. Having experienced a
momentous success together, Gorbachev and Reagan found a
more willing partner in their counterpart. 40
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The most significant sign of a changed Soviet approach to
foreign affairs emerged when Gorbachev announced that the
Soviet Union would withdraw from Afghanistan. In a memo to
Secretary Shultz on March 20, 1987, Undersecretary of State for
Political Affairs Michael Armacost reported that during a
consultation on foreign diplomacy with Soviet Foreign Minister
Eduard Shevardnadze, he categorically declared that the Soviets
“should get their troops out of Afghanistan promptly if they are
serious about promoting real change in East-West relations.”41
Pursuant to Gorbachev’s drive to focus Soviet efforts inward and
stop the financial bleeding of external conflicts, the general
secretary announced in April 1988 that the Soviet Union would
withdraw its forces from Afghanistan in an even faster manner
than Shevardnadze described to Armacost.42
Gorbachev’s interaction with Afghan President
Mohammad Najibullah, the former leader of the People’s
Democratic Party of Afghanistan, reinforced that a changed
ideology, rather than just fiscal practicality, motivated this shift
in policy regarding the Third World. In a July 1987 conversation
between the two leaders, Gorbachev demonstrated a growing
understanding and acceptance of pluralism and of the problems
that had plagued socialist governments. At the highest levels of
the PDPA, Najibullah admitted, “narrow-mindedness of views, a
lack of initiative, a disinclination to free themselves of the
burdens of past mistakes, and conservatism” hurt the Party’s goals
in Afghanistan and the prospects of Soviet withdrawal.43 When
Najibullah stated “national reconciliation required new
approaches and an abandonment of stereotypes and methods
which have outlived themselves,” he was clearly talking about
socialism. 44 Gorbachev was quick to agree. The leader of the
socialist world was coming to terms with the notion that socialism
had inherent flaws. As a result, Gorbachev increasingly focused
his efforts inward on the Soviet Union to repair his faltering
system, rather than remain involved in expensive Third World
conflicts. As a result, Gorbachev announced on February 8, 1988
that if the Soviets could strike a multilateral understanding of the
terms for withdrawal, he would begin removing troops by May 8,
1988.
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In the interim between the announcement and intended
start date, Gorbachev, Shevardnadze, Shultz, and National
Security Advisor Colin Powell met. The tone of this meeting was
very cordial. Unlike previous meetings such as the Geneva
Conference in which Third World support proved to be a source
of discord for the two countries, in this interaction the leaders
spoke more as partners than as adversaries. In fact, Shevardnadze
called this conversation “a meeting of the minds” on
Afghanistan. 45 Gorbachev substantiated his commitment to
withdrawing from Third World embroilments by announcing
removal of Soviet troops from the most prominent Third World
conflict. 46
The superpowers started showing a willingness to arrive
at agreements on Third World issues. Gorbachev sought to focus
Soviet efforts inward rather than allocate resources he did not
possess to Third World conflicts that were not his main concern.
As the regional conflict in southern Africa grew increasingly
tense in 1987 and 1988, this newfound cooperation proved useful
as the Soviets decided not to interfere in the negotiating process.
Moreover, the modulation of the U.S.-Soviet relationship in the
Third World allayed both countries’ fears that their adversary
remained committed to spreading their system throughout the
world. This led to a changed security environment that was
conducive to resolving the conflict. But despite these momentous
changes, another country possessed even greater leverage than the
U.S. or the Soviet Union.
The Cuban Factor
Cuba had been a mainstay in southern Africa throughout
the regional conflict. As the only outside power to send troops to
the region, Cuba established authority distinct from other external
players. The Cubans successfully fended off the initial South
African invasion in Angola between 1975 and 1976. They
remained in the country and continued to protect the MPLA. To
Cuba, America’s support for South Africa and UNITA
endangered Angolan and Namibian freedom. Castro would not
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remove his troops while these threats persisted. Thus, Cuba stood
by its southern African allies for fourteen years.47
Cuba remained in Angola as a defensive force and stood
prepared to counterstrike at any moment. In the summer of 1987,
South Africa invaded Angola to defend the faltering UNITA
military. The South African military stepped up to battle
FAPLA—the military wing of the MPLA—at the MPLA military
base in Cuito Cuanavale. The SADF turned around FAPLA,
which safeguarded Jonas Savimbi and UNITA. Savimbi and
General Geldennhuys rejoiced in victory, thinking they had
routed the Angolan forces and secured the base. However, their
military intelligence was insufficient—the South Africans had
been informed only by UNITA reports. In reality, the Cubans
hurriedly moved to repel the South Africans from Cuito
Cuanavale.48
Cuba exhibited strength through military defense. U.S.
intelligence analysts telegrammed to Secretary Shultz that Cuban
forces were storming towards Cuito Cuanavale. The telegram
noted that “the Cuban press has been careful to emphasize that
Cuban troops [had] not been involved in combat.”49 Only after the
SADF crossed the Namibian border and attacked Cuito
Cuanavale would Cuba mobilize its forces in Angola to reverse
an offensive. Far from blustering and bluffing as Crocker saw the
Cuban leader, Castro had been slowly increasing his military
presence to defend against this kind of unprovoked attack. By the
time the South Africans invaded Angola again in 1987, Castro
boasted 55,000 troops at his disposal and they handily repelled
the attack.50 Cuba readily proved its military hegemony.
Castro’s decision to send more Cuban troops and
weaponry strained Cuban-Soviet relations. The Cubans had
hoped that the Soviets would provide arms in the face of South
African aggression. The decision to commit their forces to
repelling the attack was an arduous one in which Castro and his
generals had to determine whether the situation was dire enough
to risk Cuban lives to save this town from South African invasion.
An icy summit meeting between Castro and Gorbachev in
Moscow resulted in Cuba accepting the fact that if they were to
respond, they would be doing it alone. Castro remained undecided
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about sending troops until he returned to Cuba and read General
Arnaldo Ochoa’s sobering assessment that “if the morale and the
fighting capacity of the units are not reestablished, a catastrophe
is inevitable.” 51 Thus, the Cubans—without notifying the
Soviets—struck back in Cuito Cuanavale and reversed South
Africa’s advance. With this decision, Cuba established that it
would act independently of the Soviet Union and take on a greater
role in the southern Africa conflict.52
The Reagan administration knew that the Cubans
maintained a strong military presence in southern Africa, but it
still underestimated the significance of Cuba’s presence in the
region. Crocker acknowledged that the Cubans were a “force that
you could say was in some way going to be able to challenge the
South African conventional forces.” 53 However, the extent to
which Castro and the Cubans would gain leverage in southern
Africa proved beyond what Crocker had expected. Defying the
Soviets and operating as an independent entity, Cuba asserted
itself as the dominant foreign power. Cuba had gained leverage
after Cuito Cuanavale displayed its military superiority. A cold
silence ensued in the Cuban-Soviet relationship in which the
Cubans asserted their leading role in southern Africa. After nearly
two months of silence, the Soviets came to terms with the fact that
southern Africa was now “a Cuban campaign, the Cubans alone
would direct it, the Soviets would be informed, but they would
not be consulted.”54
Gorbachev, committed to ratcheting back the Soviet
Union’s commitments in the Third World, accepted this reality.
Cuba’s strength forced the Soviets to take a lesser role in the
region, which Gorbachev could justify by focusing on Soviet
domestic problems. The Soviets could quietly extricate
themselves from this conflict without causing damage to the
Soviet regime. When Cuba and the United States pressured South
Africa to come to the negotiating table, the Soviets closely
watched the proceedings even though they would not directly
participate. Rather, the United States freely mediated the talks
without Cold War impulses, and Cuba possessed the critical
negotiating strength.
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Negotiations: How the Conflict Ended
South Africa’s status as a pariah state, Cuba’s military
dominance, and the improvement to the U.S.-Soviet relationship
in the Third World provided the necessary context for the
negotiations that ended the regional conflict in southern Africa.
South Africa’s failed invasions and increased repression at home
weakened its credibility with the United States. Congress’
increasingly hardline stance on South Africa and Pretoria’s near
universal condemnation left it without bargaining power at the
negotiating table. Cuba’s reversal of South Africa’s advances
established it (along with its MPLA partners) as the military
hegemon. Cuba thus entered negotiations with strength and
authority. The Soviet Union’s altered security environment
allowed it to accept that Cuba would not act as a Soviet client.
Moreover, having relaxed competition with the Soviet Union in
the Third World, the United States could more effectively
negotiate because it did not fear Soviet adventurism. April 14,
1988 marked the beginning of an eight-month process of
negotiations.
By March 1988, the Reagan administration no longer
overtly supported South Africa. While Congress had usurped
much of the administration’s formal policymaking power, Reagan,
Shultz, and Crocker still covertly engaged with South African
leaders. Crocker met with South African Foreign Minister Pik
Botha in March 1988 in Geneva. He hoped to “help Botha
persuade his truculent leadership to come back into the
[negotiating] process.” 55 However, this round of negotiations
would prove different from previous talks between Angola, South
Africa, and the other actors. In a letter from George Shultz to Pik
Botha, Shultz “expressed dismay at the renewed internal
repression, urging Botha to avoid a gratuitous confrontation with
Western governments and public opinion.” 56 The secretary’s
letter conveyed to Botha that the U.S. would not support Pretoria
as it had in the past. In these negotiations, the United States truly
mediated and did not overtly influence on South Africa’s behalf.
The significant losses that South Africa suffered in the
Battle of Cuito Cuanavale pushed some leaders of the ruling
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National Party to seek withdrawal from Angola. Cuban military
power induced South Africa to come to the negotiating table,
which it did in London in May 1988. In London, though, the
South African delegation, headed by senior Foreign Ministry
Official Neil van Heerden, was “not yet ready to negotiate” in any
real capacity. 57 Van Heerden hastily concocted a delegation
which included General Geldenhuys, who just days before fought
in Cuito Cuanavale. The interlocutors included Cuba, Angola,
and South Africa, with Chester Crocker from the U.S. as mediator.
The Soviets, conspicuously absent from the talks, played a
decidedly inactive role throughout the negotiations. Though the
London talks did not lead to significant progress, they did mark
the beginning of the essential negotiation process. 58
During the next two meetings at Brazzaville and Cairo,
South Africa arrived at the negotiating table intending to recoup
authority. It looked to assert strength by demanding that the
linkage between the implementation of UN Resolution 435 and
Cuban troop withdrawals be the basis for negotiation. But Cuba,
armed with geostrategic superiority, did not immediately respond
to South Africa’s bluster at Brazzaville. The Cuban delegation
took time to formulate a strategy. When the parties met again in
Cairo, Cuba entered with a clear goal—to pressure the South
Africans to agree to a plan for Namibian independence and
withdraw their troops from Angola and Namibia. Cuba would
leave Angola once South Africa met both conditions. It reoriented
the negotiations around this plan and hoped the possibility of
further military advancement would cause Pretoria to concede.
Though Castro and his team had been willing to negotiate with
the South Africans in London and Brazzaville, in Cairo they
desired to project strength. Castro called Pretoria’s bluff.59
By the time the Cairo talks occurred, the Soviets and
Americans clearly held the same goals. Both countries wanted
South Africa and Cuba to withdraw their forces, for Angola to
settle its internal struggle politically rather than militarily, and for
Namibian independence to come to fruition in the coming months.
This convergence of aims allowed the Soviet Union to feel
comfortable taking a secondary role in the negotiations. Chester
Crocker offered Soviet diplomats like Anatoly Adamashin and
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Vladlen Vasev greater involvement in the negotiations, but they
ultimately demurred, preferring “to distance themselves from
whatever went wrong while keeping a close eye on the talks by
talking with [the U.S.] and with their socialist allies.” 60 The
Soviets did not need to prolong the conflict, for their original
goals of countering American adventurism and establishing a
Marxist stronghold (which Cuban involvement was facilitating)
no longer reflected their primary concern.61
The Cuban agenda mostly aligned with the American and
Soviet one. All three countries desired an independent Namibia
and withdrawal of foreign troops from Angola and Namibia. The
only substantial divergence was that the Cubans would not
withdraw before South Africa categorically accepted Resolution
43. Thus, Cuba had reversed the American policy of linkage.
Whereas the Americans initially pushed for Cuba to leave as a
prerequisite for South Africa accepting Resolution 435, Cuba’s
geopolitical advantage meant it had the leverage to reverse the
parameters of the negotiation. It would certainly withdraw, in line
with Cuba’s ultimate goal, but on its own terms.62
The South Africans then made a critical military mistake.
On June 26, 1988, they again invaded Angola in a desperate effort
to regain a strategic advantage in southern provinces of Angola.
In doing so the SADF killed 10 Cuban troops. The Cubans
responded tactfully and powerfully, forcing the SADF to retreat.
At this point, the South African people had become disillusioned
by repeated failed invasions. Rather than continuing to absorb
military defeats, Pretoria shifted the battleground from Angolan
soil to the South African press. P.W. Botha’s government
designed a propaganda campaign to bolster anti-Cuban sentiment
and maintain support for South Africa’s regional adventurism.
However, disapproval of South Africa’s involvement in Angola
grew, and pressure—both domestic and international—mounted
for the government to reach an agreement. The failure of this
military strike cemented Cuba’s military dominance and reflected
a crucial turning point in the negotiations.63
Further meetings in New York and Cape Verde featured a
changed South African delegation. Having realized the extent of
their military inferiority after the June attack, the South Africans
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adopted a more conciliatory tone in New York. They attempted
to squeeze at least some concessions out of the Cuban delegation
to placate hardliners in Pretoria. Yet, the Cubans remained
confident in their superior position and forced the South Africans’
hands. Crocker, free from Cold War pressures to forestall the
Soviet goals, skillfully mediated the negotiations. The talks in
New York led to an informal ceasefire and, more importantly, the
South Africa delegation “accepted the Cuban demands” in full.64
Cuba—and therefore Angola and Namibia—had won the
diplomatic struggle. The South African forces started
withdrawing from Angola and Namibia in August 1988 and
completed that process in November of the following year.
Southern Africa remained mostly free from regional violence and
international influence. In December 1988, the foreign ministers
of Cuba, the MPLA government in Angola, and South Africa
signed the Angola-Namibia Accords. This agreement formally
ended foreign involvement in the two countries and put into
motion the implementation of Resolution 435. The United States
and the Soviet Union achieved their shared goals in the last round
of negotiations. The conflict was over.
Conclusion
The domestic conflicts in southern Africa were never truly
domestic. In the Cold War era, the bipolar world order dictated
that the two superpowers competed in vulnerable areas.
Ideological rigidity characterized the first decade of the conflict
in southern Africa; both the Americans and the Soviets sought to
counteract their foe from gaining influence in the region. The two
sides distrusted each other and supported client governments
accordingly.
But after 1985, the outlook of the regional conflict
changed. South Africa’s increased repression further isolated the
country from the international community. Cuba repelled several
South African invasions and bolstered its military hegemony.
‘New thinking’ in the Soviet Union and an altered security
perception towards the Third World eased the tensions between
the U.S. and USSR in the latter half of the 1980s. This opened the
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door for Cuba to emerge as the dominant power in the
peacemaking process. The easing of tensions allowed Cuba to
redefine the terms of negotiation without external interference
and made the U.S. comfortable shepherding the negotiations
towards peace as a less ideological mediator.
Cuba’s commitment to Angola and Namibia, both in
thought and in action, proved effective. Its decisions were central
to the end of the conflict. Cuba usurped power from the Soviet
Union, brought the South Africans to the table, and ultimately
established the terms of the peace in southern Africa. In the
negotiations, the United States acted freely as a mediator rather
than a committed partner to South Africa as a result of the
modulated superpower relationship. ‘New thinking’ and a fresh
Soviet leadership provided the impetus to redefine the terms of
that relationship. The regional conflict ended due to Cuban
strength, American and Soviet cooperation, and South Africa’s
repression and intransigence.
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